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Abstract 
The following thesis aims to research Russia’s status-seeking strategy after Putin’s return 
to power in 2012, which marked the emergence of state’s aggressive foreign policy. Shortly 
after the annexation of Crimea, Russia made an extraordinary move and first time after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow projected its military power outside of post-Soviet 
region – in Syria.  In addition to this, during Putin’s third term as president, discourses 
about Russia’s unique civilizational identity and state’s commitment to defend traditional 
values worldwide appeared in the Russian politics and public space. Drawing upon the 
social identity theory, this thesis seeks to examine whether Russia’s recent military 
campaigns coupled with resurgence of civilizational and conservative discourses can be 
considered as the main constituencies of its desire to enhance state’s international status 
and standing. The following work pays a particular attention to socio-psychological factors, 
such as need for positive social identity and national self-esteem, subjective perceptions, 
status-related emotions, while analyzing Russia’s status-seeking behavior. It also tries to 
address the current debates about the status markers in a contemporary international system 
and the concluding part of thesis sets out to review the specific markers of Russia’s 
international status from the point of view of its ruling elite. The overall implication of this 
work is to research and unpack the foundations of Russia current assertiveness that can 
contribute to a better understanding of its goals and future activities.  
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Introduction 
 
Russia’s assertive foreign policy during Putin’s third presidential tenure sparked fierce 
debates about the sources of its bellicose actions. Along with an overt rivalry with the 
West, exemplified by its annexation of Crimea and military support to Assad’s regime in 
Syria, Moscow has made a civilization turn and consequently, discourse about Russia’s 
unique civilization identity has re-emerged in the mainstream political debates. 
Furthermore, Putin’s third term marked the resurgence of traditional values. These 
developments resulted in ostensible antagonism between Russia’s traditional values and 
Western liberal values, while mounting great power sentiments in Russia exacerbated the 
level of confrontation with the Western major powers. It leads to the heightened need for 
exploring the origins of Russia’s activities from the different theoretical perspectives. 
Hence, the thesis examines the socio-psychological foundations of Russia’s belligerent 
foreign policy conduct, along with its new ideological course. Consistent with this task, this 
study investigates how Russia’s political elite perceives and interprets the behavior of the 
Western countries and then how it constructs state’s policy based on these perceptions. 
Against this backdrop, this study seeks to analyze the role of factors, such as subjective 
perceptions, status concern and related emotions affect in Moscow’s foreign policy conduct 
and domestic developments during Putin’s third term. The main assumptions of this work 
are the following. Firstly, the two episodes of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy mentioned 
above are largely driven by the Kremlin’s longing to tackle with its great power status 
inconsistency problem and its current assertiveness aims at external validation of its image 
as a great power. 1 Secondly, recurrence of civilizational discourse and conservative turn 
might serve for the purpose of enhancing the status of Russia as an independent pole in a 
multipolar world. The theoretical framework based on the social identity theory (SIT) 
seems quite pertinent to research social-psychological aspects of Russia’s status-related 
assertive gestures. What is more, this particular theory will be used in conjunction with 
constructivism, given that this work mainly focuses on Russia’s subjective perceptions of 
its status, treatment from the Western countries etc. According to social constructivism, 
                                                 
1 Status inconsistency denotes the situation, when actor believes that its status deserves a greater recognition 
by other actors than they respect and recognize it at the present. 
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social actions take place in a particular social context and social actors attach subjective 
meaning to it (Priya 2016). 
The social identity theory in international relations is applied to research states’ effort 
to create a positive social identity and improve their status and relative standing. As the 
traditional social identity theory (SIT) posits, individuals have an intrinsic need to enhance 
their self-esteem and maintain positive social identity that can be gained by membership in 
a positively evaluated social group/category. Positive evaluation is attained through 
favorable social comparison to the relevant reference group. However, if the social 
comparison is unfavorable, groups strive to improve it and obtain the positive social 
identity. By doing so, they have to adopt the behavioral strategies—identity management 
strategies, such as social mobility, social competition or social creativity (Tajfel & Turner 
1979, p. 43-45). 
Likewise, according to SIT/IR framework, the political leadership of a country is 
motivated by the psychological need to improve nation self-esteem and maintain positive 
social identity and this motivation incites them to pursue the different identity management 
strategies (Clunan 2009, 2012,). For this reason, they develop national self-images, based 
on which, the ruling elite identifies certain countries and regions as would-be in-groups and 
out-groups. Construction of in-groups and out-groups is made based on perceived 
“similarity and dissimilarity along with value dimensions as well as material and status 
dimensions.” Perception of shared commonalities encourages states to consider themselves 
as members of one social category - in-group, whereas out-groups are formed on the basis 
of the lack of shared ties. These social categories can be inter alia “great power”, “the 
West”, “nuclear power” etc. (Clunan 2009, p. 48). Consequently, in order to maintain a 
positive social identity, political elite pursues identity management strategies toward those 
in-groups and out-groups. This thesis describes Russia’s current leadership as proponents  
of the Statist national self-image. For this particular self-image, the great power club 
represents the in-group and Russia considers that it has a legitimate place in this group. 
However, Moscow claims that other group members, mainly Western established great 
powers do not respect its status and privileges that undermines Russia’s relative standing in 
the great power rankings. On these grounds, it develops a competitive strategy towards 
these countries with an aim to improve its relative standing in the great power in-group.  
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On the other hand, the West represents the partial out-group, from which Moscow seeks 
to maintain a positive distinctiveness and by so doing to improve its status as an 
independent center in a multipolar world. Significantly, great power group and the West are 
two overlapping social categories that make the latter not fully out-group, but just partial 
out-group. In other words, the West is an out-group for Russia, because the current regime 
claims that Russia is impossible to become the Western country (lack of shared ties), 
however, it is partially out-group, because the Western countries, which are members of 
Russia’s great power are also members of “the West” social category. Anne Clunan dubs it 
as cross-cutting group membership in a sense that similar to individuals, states also have 
multiple identities (2009, p. 49). This thesis also argues that subjective perceptions, beliefs 
and emotions have a significant influence on Moscow’s decision while choosing the 
specific identity management strategy towards in-group and out-group.   
Research problem. This thesis assumes that the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s 
intervention in Syria, its civilizational turn and resurgence of traditional values represent 
the essential elements of its status-seeking strategy. Much of the intellectual debates have 
been focused on the domestic factors, such as regime stability, fear of the “colour 
revolution”, attempt to distract people’s attention from the mounting economic problems, 
as the main determinants of the Kremlin’s policy (see Liik 2015, Gorenburg 2014, The 
Economist 2016). Undeniably, these aspects have played an important role in Russia’s 
strategic calculation, however, these approaches tend to overlook the psychological, social 
and emotional motives behind Russia’s foreign policy behavior and the new ideological 
course. Hence, those authors, who focus on the instrumental rationality of Russia’s 
behavior, do not pay sufficient attention to factors, such as need for positive social identity 
and national self-esteem, status concern and related emotions. Furthermore, traditional 
theoretical accounts do not provide a sufficient analysis of the behavioral consequences of 
states’ perceived role in international relations and historically determined aspirations of its 
foreign policy. Finally yet importantly, through the prism of traditional theories, above-
mentioned four cases might seem disconnected from each other. However, this thesis seeks 
to provide a comprehensive and monolithic theoretical framework, which will enable us to 
find the commonalities and bind them together, as the main cornerstones of Russia’s status-
seeking strategy after 2012. 
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Apparently, the dominant theoretical approaches put forward different perspectives on 
state’s concerns about its relative status. Proponents of realism focus on material 
components of the status and argue that state can significantly enhance it by means of 
power maximization. More on that, this school suggests that positive status represents a 
national interest for countries and dissatisfaction with the status or attempts to undermine it 
can lead to the great power wars (Mearsheimer 2006; Wohlforth 2009, as cited in Clunan 
2014, p. 283). However, this line of reasoning no longer seems viable, given that the 
increasing material capabilities solely cannot enhance state’s status. In this vein, this thesis 
argues that status issue is not reducible to the material capabilities and it has acquired the 
normative dimensions as well. In contrast to realism, liberalism focuses on norm adoption 
and membership in the major institutions as an opportunity for states to improve their 
relative status (Newmann 2008; Suzuki 2008). Nevertheless, Russia seems subdued to 
subscribe to the Western liberal norms and relentlessly contests the prevalence of this value 
system in international relations. What is more, it seeks to achieve higher status by means 
of maintaining a distinctive identity from the West. Likewise, the second promise of 
liberalism also seems unfeasible, given that although Russia is a member of the major 
international organizations that is considered as the significant status marker in the West, 
Moscow still expresses its dissatisfaction with its existing status recognition. It generates 
the need for further research to find out how Russia understands its status recognition, why 
the current relative status is insufficient for it etc. As long as Russia’s foreign policy is 
getting more and more unpredictable and aggressive, we need a better understanding of its 
status-related concerns, since there is a growing support to the claim that it represents one 
of the main pillars of its assertiveness.  
This study covers the period from 2012 to 2016 and suggests that Russia’s political 
leadership pursues a mixture of identity management strategies to enhance its international 
status. The main purpose of this study is to research the existing links between subjective 
perceptions, psychological needs (positive and distinctive social identity, higher-status) and 
related emotions (ressentiment, vengefulness) caused by its status dissatisfaction that might 
contribute to the development of Russia’s foreign policy course and the main ideological 
changes – civilisational and conservative turns. This study also seeks to find out sources of 
Russia’s status-related concerns and explains Moscow’s modus operandi in the discursive 
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construction of its current resurgence using its humiliation narrative. Given this 
background, this thesis sets out to answer the following research questions:  
1. How Russia’s quest for great power status is exemplified in its foreign policy 
conduct during Putin’s third presidential term?  
2. How Russia seeks to reinforce the normative aspects of its desired status as a 
sovereign pole in a multipolar world?  
This work also seeks to address three additional questions: 
3. How subjective perceptions and emotional factors instigate Russia’s status-seeking 
behavior? 
4. Which behavioral strategies Russia is using to enhance its international status and 
relative standing?  
5. What are the markers of Russia’s status recognition from the perspective of its 
ruling elite? 
 
As it will be explained in the methodology part, I am using the interpretive method of 
social science research. In contrast to positivist approach, interpretive approach does not 
intend to research causality and for this method, a researcher does not predefine the 
independent and dependent variables, therefore it is not a common practice to have the 
clearly articulated hypotheses in the beginning of the study. Based on it, the ensuing 
section does not present hypotheses, but only basic assumptions and here is the brief 
summary of the main arguments: 
1)      Consistent with the social competition strategy, Russia intervened in Ukraine and 
provided support to Assad’s regime with an intention to overhaul its great power status 
inconsistency problem. Russia needs to obtain the social recognition from other great 
powers as a fully-fledged member of this social category to heal its status inconsistency 
problem. Recognition of its status from other great powers would enhance Russia’s positive 
social identity that derives from group membership and would fix its status inconsistency 
problem.  
2)     Consistent with the social creativity, strategy, political establishment revived discourse 
about Russia, as a unique state-civilization and exalted conservative values with an 
intention to enhance normative aspects of its desired status as an independent center in a 
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multipolar world. Russia believes that it must become an independent civilizational pole in 
a multipolar world. This aspiration lends credence to Moscow’s endeavors to develop a 
distinctive civilization identity, underpinning to this status. The unique civilizational 
identity is a recently re-emerged dimension, on which Russia wants to be compared with 
the West out-group to gain its respectful place by dint of proving its moral and 
civilizational superiority vis-à-vis the West out-group. 
3)      Russia’s subjective perception of impermeability of great power in-group borders, 
coupled with viewing status hierarchy between Russia and the ‘established great powers’, 
between Russia and the West as illegitimate and unstable, pushed Russia to adopt social 
competition and social creativity strategies towards this in-group and out-group. In 
addition, perceived humiliation and consequent emotions played a significant role in 
Russia’s decision to pursue specific identity management strategies. Tajfel notes that the 
selection of specific identity management strategy largely depends on the perception of 
higher group status as legitimate or illegitimate, stable or instable (Tajfel 1978, as it is cited 
in Hinkle et al. 2011, p. 167). According to traditional SIT, individual adopts social 
mobility strategy, only if s/he perceives boundaries of the higher status group as permeable. 
However, if higher-status group borders are perceived as impermeable and status hierarchy 
as illegitimate/unstable, then social creativity or social competition strategies seem to be 
the viable strategies. Relationship and status hierarchy between lower-status group and 
higher-status group can be perceived as legitimate and stable, if lower-status group thinks 
that the existing status quo is justified and impossible to change. If status hierarchy and 
existing status allocation are seen as legitimate and stable, social competition or creativity 
strategies are less likely to be adopted by this group, because lower-status groups are aware 
of the fact that it can hardly undermine the status quo. (Brown & Ross 1982, as it is cited in 
Hinke et al. p. 170; Klippenberg 1989, as it is cited in Clunan 2009, p. 35; Larson & 
Shecvhenko 2010, 2014; Ward 2014).  
Against this backdrop, this thesis introduces a number of novel departures: 1. This 
thesis investigates how Russia carries out different identity management strategies to 
achieve its status-related aspirations during Putin’s third term. The only author so far, who 
has written about Russia’s conduct of identity management strategies during Putin’s third 
term, is Alfred Evans (2015). However, he focuses on social creativity strategy and 
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conservative values only, while my thesis introduces three additional cases for analysis, 
plus it incorporates the new identity management strategy - social competition. 2. This 
thesis examines Russia’s recent military actions as part of its social competition strategy for 
status, while the previous works about Russia and social identity theory have never done it. 
In this vein, this work provides an updated knowledge about the different facets of identity 
management strategies within Russia’s context 3. This work brings together two ideational 
partners - social constructivism and social identity theory from two different disciplines in 
an effort to build the bridge between them and seeks to give a consistent account of the role 
of subjective perceptions, psychological needs and emotional factors in the creation of 
states’ status-related aspirations. 4. Russia’s case is also different in a sense that in contrast 
to other rising or status dissatisfied powers after the end of the bipolar system, Russia is 
ready to use its hard power to attain respect and status recognition from the ‘legitimate 
great powers’. Give this background, this thesis also seeks to examine the existing links 
between status inconsistency and interstate conflict/violence.  
As for the main limitations of this study, this work does not argue that status aspiration 
is the only driving factor of Russians assertive foreign policy and the ideological 
developments, but it assumes that it can be deemed as one of the main motivations of the 
Kremlin, exemplified in the particular foreign policy behavior. Second, I lack space here to 
analyze as to whether and to what extend these identity management strategies have 
already assisted Russia to enhance its status, therefore it is not the aim of this study. 
Finally, this work does not claim that Russia’s assertiveness was objectively instigated by 
the West’s actions (disrespect of its status). Rather, it seeks to analyze how Russia’s current 
assertiveness was constructed based on Moscow’s subjective perceptions related to its 
status respect and recognition. Therefore, the West’s particular behaviors will be analyzed 
as seen from the Russian perspective and this thesis does not seek to investigate, whether 
Russia’s perceptions are real or unreal, are in accord with the West actual recognition of 
Russia’s status or not. Likewise, the thesis does not intend to investigate whether Russia’s 
humiliation is real or not, rather it should be viewed as the specific social construct, not 
necessarily the objective one.  
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Methodology of study 
As mentioned earlier, I am using an interpretive approach of social science research. 
According to this approach, social reality is different from natural reality and what is more, 
it does not recognize the existence of objective reality in contrast to the positivist science 
(Gray 2009). Interpretive social science views facts as embedded within a meaning system 
and they are not impartial, objective, or neutral (Newmann 1997, as it is cited in Stuart et 
al, p. 33). In contrast to positivits approach, interpretive approach does not rely on causal 
laws and in an interpretive case study, the researcher analyses, interprets and theorizes 
about the phenomenon against the backdrop of a theoretical framework (Antwi & Hamza 
2015, p. 219). The positivist researchers begin process with introduction of cause-effect 
relationship and causal laws, because they do not trust to subjective perceptions. By 
contrast, interpretive approach aims to explain the subjective reasons and meanings that lie 
behind the certain social actions (Blanche et al 2006).  Interpretive researcher seeks to learn 
more about actor’s views and seeks to find out how these views might instigate particular 
behavior. Furthermore, as long as the interpretive approach does not intend to explain 
causalities, we do not have the predefined dependent and independent variables and social 
process is not encapsulated in hypothetical deductions (Kaplan and Maxwell 1994, p. 35). 
It also does not aim to produce a new theory, rather, it seeks to evaluate and refine the pre-
existing theories (Antwi & Hamza 2015, p. 219).  Interpretive approach and social 
constructivism seek to comprehend the particular phenomena by means of evaluating the 
meanings actors assign to them, therefore looking at their subjective experiences is 
important to grasp how they construct meaning.  
This thesis mainly relies on the qualitative research methods in a sense that it represents 
the best way of researching complex social group behavior. Qualitative methods help me to 
analyze what meanings do Russia’s political elite give to the different events, how do they 
evaluate the West’s respect of Russia’s status, what experiences do they have from this 
situation and how subjective perceptions might influence Russia’s actions. I mainly relied 
on the discourse analysis and in particular, the Critical Discourse Analysis, which sees 
discursive practices as an important form of social practice in shaping the social world. 
From this perspective, discourse reproduces and changes the system of meanings, 
contributes to the construction of social identities and social relations (Jorgensen & Phillips 
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2002, p. 70). The main aim of CDA is to explore the links between language use and social 
practice and intends to shed light on the linguistic discursive dimension of social 
phenomena. According to the CDA, language-as-discourse is a form of action through 
which people can change the world and objects acquire meaning only through discourse 
(Ibidem).  
The first part of the study mainly reviews the secondary sources, different theoretical 
literature on status and status inconsistency problem, state’s humiliation and identity 
management strategies. Subsequently, while analyzing the humiliation motif, I look at the 
official speeches of Russia’s political leadership as well as the articles written by different 
Russian and Western scholars. The matter is that Russia’s humiliation narrative is 
interpreted by different actors, such as the political leaders, scholars, public figures for the 
sake of instilling this feeling into the society. The next part about subjective perceptions 
and emotions also consists of the analysis of different speeches and academic writings on 
these issues. When it comes to the empirical part, I mainly rely on different reports, 
analysis, studies in order to gather the information about Russia’s behavior on the ground 
in Ukraine and Syria and by doing so, I examine the presence of indicators of social 
competition strategy in its foreign policy conduct.  As for the final part, it mainly relied on 
the discourse analysis the speeches, interviews, and articles by President Vladimir Putin, 
foreign affairs minister Sergey Lavrov. In addition to this, Russia’s state official documents 
and different academic writings were used for the sake of the better analysis of new 
discourses.  
 
Theoretical background   
This thesis seeks to contribute to building bridges between two theories – social 
constructivism and social psychology. Allegedly, these two ideational partners have a 
potential to strengthen each other in the analysis of state’s foreign policy, since they seem 
viable to address those issues, which rationalist/materialist approaches fail to cover 
(Vaughn et al 2011). This thesis employs the social identity theory from the social 
psychology to examine Russia’s craving for positive and distinctive social identity, 
whereas social constructivism is used to examine the role of agents’ subjective perceptions 
of the world, its status, how other states treat them etc. Russia’s subjective perceptions 
15 
 
sustain its psychological needs, such as positive social identity and national self-esteem that 
shape its behavior. Thus, what connect these two is believe in the centrality of human 
subjectivity and social identity to our understanding of the political world and their focus 
on ideational factors (ibidem). Subjective perceptions and social-psychological motivations 
drive social actions. 
According to the social identity theory, social groups/social categories are positioned in 
a vertical status hierarchy and lower-status groups have a psychological need to improve 
their relative position. On these grounds, groups adopt identity management strategies, 
which help them to establish a positive comparison with higher-status groups. Consistent 
with this logic, aspiration to become a member of a higher-status social category plays an 
important role in shaping state’s social identity and this is where social constructivism and 
social psychology overlap. Status is a social phenomenon, which denotes individuals’ 
membership into the particular social category and along similar lines, individual’s social 
identity stems from membership in various social groups (Tajfel 1978).  
According to Tajfel and Turner, “social identity consists of those aspects of an 
individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself 
as belonging” (1979, p. 101). Similarly, nation’s positive social identity derives from the 
state’s identification with a high status group. Social identity is relative, comparative and 
has certain behavioral consequences (Ibidem). For this reason, groups always seek to 
identify themselves with a high status group, however, when the latter derogates their 
aspiration to join this group and therefore comparison with this group is unfavorable, SIT 
argues that lower-status group can adopt identity management strategies. Hence, the state 
becomes status-seeker, because it represents the group consisting of people/nation, who 
have the inherited psychological need for favorable comparison to the higher status group 
and to the significant ‘Other’. 
 This thesis also argues that along with an unfavorable comparison with the ‘legitimate 
great powers’ and the West, Russia’s existing self-comparison with its past Self, with its 
relevant past, is also unfavorable that augments Moscow’s status-seeking behavior. In other 
words, Moscow aspires to gain recognition from the ‘established great powers’ to maintain 
a favorable social comparison with them and in the meantime, it wants to regain back its 
great power status to maintain a favorable temporal comparison with its own past Self. As 
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Waever puts it, “state identities can coalesce around both social and temporal forms of 
differentiation” (1996, as it is cited in Freedman 2016, p. 807). Secondly, Moscow seeks to 
improve its unfavorable comparison with the West by means of maintaining the positive 
and distinctive identity from this out-group, the significant ‘Other’. For this reason, it 
pursues the different identity management strategies. Recognition and social affirmation by 
other group members increases the national self-esteem, which together with belonging to 
some groups is fundamental, psychological need of people (Hogg/Abrams 2003; De 
Cremer/Mulder 2007, as it is cited in Wolf 2011). By contrast, devaluation of state’s 
relative standing and status or attempts to lower the state’s rank on which it grounds its 
status, is a humiliating experience. Humiliation triggers an instinctive response pattern, 
such as ressentiment, anger and vengefulness, an essential part of the human psyche (Wolf 
2011). 
Many of the theoretical debates have converged around the statement that the status has 
material, normative and psychological dimensions. Allegedly, inherited psychological 
desire for collective self-esteem incites individuals to identify themselves with those social 
groups, which can enhance their positive social identity. Similarly, states and their political 
leaders are motivated to augment national, collective self-esteem by country’s membership 
into the privileged group/social category, which increases state’s relative status. Given that 
great powerness remains an indispensable element of Russia’s national identity and 
represents its intrinsic historical aspiration, Russia’s great power status inconsistency and 
the U.S. dominance in the international system contain a danger of reducing people’s 
national self-esteem. As Russia’s political elite claims, the perceived reluctance of the 
‘established great powers’ to acknowledge Russia’s status turns into its humiliation that 
instigates the different emotions, such as ressentiment and feeling of vengefulness. 
Therefore, political leadership employs different identity management strategies to 
overhaul its status-related concerns and escape from alleged humiliation, which is 
discursively constructed by different mobilizing actors. Humiliation is also about 
perceptions, since it is difficult to measure, whether people really feel humiliated and 
whether this humiliation is “real” or not. Therefore, we look at subjective-psychological 
definition of humiliation as it is articulated in Russia’s official and public discourses. 
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From traditional SIT to SIT/IR framework and level of analysis  
When we use the social identity theory to research the status phenomenon in 
international relations, we should refer to it as SIT/IR framework, in accordance with 
Ward’s suggestion (Ward 2015, p. 2).  It could be argued that competition between 
individuals as well as between states for higher status has a long historical pedigree. As 
long as a psychological need for self-esteem is inherent to human preferences, status 
aspirations play a crucial role in this process, given that high status creates individuals’ 
positive self-esteem. Similarly, state’s positive international status represents a necessary 
component for collective self-esteem of people. (Paez et al. 1998, p. 220; Clunan 2009, p. 
24). As Richard Ned Lebow puts it, preserving “self-esteem is a universal drive…state’s 
may risk much more for status and esteem than for security or wealth (2008, as it is cited in 
Liu 2015). The most prominent scholars of SIT, Tajfel and Turner employed this theory to 
explain the effects of comparison between high and low status groups and they viewed the 
collective social status i.e. status of the group as a consequence of intergroup comparison. 
As they argued, group's low subjective status position vis-à-vis the reference groups can 
hardly create a positive social identity for members of this group, whereas membership into 
the group with high subjective status position enhances positive social identity of group’s 
member individuals. (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Clunan 2009; Larson & Shevchenko 2010; 
2014). Group can be conceptualized “as a collection of individuals, who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement 
in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus 
about the evaluation of their group and of their membership of it” (Tajfel & Turner 1979, p. 
40). According to the traditional SIT, social competition and social creativity are collective 
strategies of social identity management and the entire group (not particular individuals) 
pursues it to enhance group status (Ward 2015, p.12). Against this backdrop, SIT/IR 
framework posits that state/nation (as a group) can pursue social competition or creativity 
strategies vis-à-vis higher-status group in order to improve national/collective self-esteem, 
i.e. self-esteem of its own people. A nation can be understood as a social category, which 
needs to be positively evaluated among other nations. Therefore, Russia’s recognition as a 
fully-fledged great power and as an independent center is supposed to lead into state’s 
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positive social comparison and social identity, respectively that is allegedly can have a 
positive effect on its national self-esteem.   
As you can see, the main difference between SIT and SIT/IR is the level of analysis, 
namely it is elevated from individual to state level. Since this theory is designed to explain 
the human behavior, critics might argue that the state cannot become the subject of this 
theory, because the psychological need for positive self-esteem of individuals is 
inappropriate to be considered as a foundation of state behavior. Nevertheless, Wight 
argues that group intentions are those intentions of collective, which include collective 
agency. People pursue their common goals as part of the group that is the state/nation 
(1999, cited in Wendt 2004, p. 279 – 298). Significantly, SIT also studies the relations 
among groups. McSweeney’s argument also lends credence to the assumption that 
individual needs can be attributed to collectives, such as state, given that “the starting-point 
to understanding the collective phenomenon primarily rests at the individual level”. ( 
McSweeney 1999, cited in Salkute 2016, p. 13). Along these lines, the individuals’ need for 
positive social identity is possible to be achieved by identifying with the group (nation), 
and the latter has to achieve positive social identity by membership into higher-status 
group/social category (for instance, great power ranks). According to the SIT, “when 
individuals identify with a group, they experience actions toward the group as if aimed at 
them personally…members react emotionally to events that thwart of further group goals” 
(Sasley 2011, cited in Larson & Shevchenko 2014). Therefore, elevating the level of 
analysis from individual level to the interstate level seems to be justified. Finally yet 
importantly, when people have a strong feeling of attachment to their nation and leaders, 
they pay a great deal of attention to state’s external image and status. For SIT, group is 
more than just the sum of individuals (Wolf 2011, p. 118). Having discussed the key 
postulates of social identity theory, the ensuing section is devoted to the conceptualization 
of status phenomenon and status-seeking behavior in international relations. 
 
State’s international status and status-seeking behavior 
According to Joshua Freedman’s definition, “status is a social phenomenon that 
represents an individual’s recognized position within an established hierarchy” (2016, p. 
803).  Anne Clunan additionally argues that “status is contingent on socially constructed 
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standards of belonging that are normative, not just material…. status is a key source of 
authority in world politics, and as such is a resource to be competed over and sought after” 
(2014, p. 274). Welch and colleagues define status as “collective beliefs about a given 
state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture)…in international 
politics, status manifests itself in two distinct, but related ways: as membership in a defined 
club of actors, and as relative standing within such a club” (2014, p. 7). The last point is of 
particular importance for our study, because Russia considers itself to be a member of the 
great power club, however, political leadership claims that other members challenge to its 
relative standing within this club. Status has collective, subjective, and relative nature and 
is recognized by means of voluntary deference by other countries with the same status. To 
begin with, status is collective, inasmuch as it rests on collective judgment and consensus 
within a group. In other words, only states, which already hold a certain social position, 
must bestow this social status to another status seekers and no single state is entitled to 
unilaterally confer status (Marshall 1990, cited in Welch  et al 2014, p. 8). Second, status is 
subjective, since it acquires meaning through other actors’ perceptions and therefore it is 
hard to measure. What is more, status has material and non-material dimensions and 
whereas tangible features of status (military size, economic capabilities) are relatively easy 
to measure, intangible features (cultural achievements, soft power, moral authority) are 
harder to be measured. Third, status is relative, described as a “positional good” and 
socially scarce resource, because not everyone can enjoy it. Elite groups limit membership 
into their clubs, because if everyone can become a member and enjoy the status as a 
member of it, then membership value is diminishing for everyone (Welch et al 2014; Lake 
2014). Intriguingly, SIT/IR has challenged to the widespread zero-sum understanding of 
status as a “positional good”. The traditional theories deem status comparison as a zero-
sum concept in a sense that when one state improves its status, another state’s status 
automatically declines. Contrary to this accepted wisdom, SIT theorists pointed out that the 
state possesses multiple attributes (military strength, economic capacity, cultural 
achievements, soft power), therefore status comparison does not need to be winner-take all 
competition inevitably, but it can be multidimensional (Welch et al 2014; Clunan 2014).  
As for the concept of status-seeking phenomenon, states signal about their status 
aspirations by means of verbal statements and status-seeking behavior. In the case of 
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Russia, political leadership signals about the desired higher verbally in their statements as 
well as its foreign policy conduct clearly indicate to this aspiration. Just as status consists 
of material and non-material aspects, indicators of status-seeking behavior can likewise be 
divided into two categories – material and symbolic. Activities, such as acquisition of high-
technology weapons, rapid increase of military capabilities, intervention in external 
conflicts can be deemed as material indicators of status-seeking. As for symbolic 
indicators, it includes promotion of a state's culture and achievements, alternative 
normative value system, hosting mega events and other activities, thereby state aims to 
affect the perceptions of a wider audience (Welch et al 2014, p.12) 
States and in particular, major powers strive to enhance their status for the political and 
psychological purposes. To begin with, when major power gains the social recognition of 
its status from the community of states, this state receives legitimacy to pursue a more 
vigorous foreign policy, exercise leadership on a wide range of issues, reduce costs of 
acting as a major power and play an important role in international affairs and conflict 
resolutions (Volgy & Corbetta 2014, p. 60). When it comes to status-seeking behavior for 
psychological purposes, obtaining higher status creates positive social identity for the 
nation concerned and enhances its national self-esteem, since this state is recognized as 
privileged and significant player on the international arena. Along similar lines, there is a 
consensus among scholars that “the great power status provides its citizens with positive 
individual and collective self-esteem and, therefore, is an important factor in shaping and 
affecting national identity” (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Mercer, 1995, Westle, 2011, 
cited in Urnov 2013). Hence, this thesis argues that Russia seeks to revamp it unfavorable 
social comparison with established great powers by obtaining social recognition of its great 
powerness. Secondly, Russia seeks to revamp its unfavorable temporal comparison with its 
past Self by regaining its great power status. Thirdly, it strives to overhaul an unfavorable 
social comparison with the West and tries to maintain a distinctive identity from it that 
would enhance its positions as an independent pole of global power. Given this 
background, the ensuing section sets out to review the great power status and status 
inconsistency problem. 
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Great power status, status inconsistency and recognition 
Great power is just one type of major powers and therefore, we should unpack the 
major power concept first. Volgy and colleagues argue that state can be deemed as a major 
power, if it has an opportunity to uphold its interest in international relations using 
“unusual capabilities” that primarily entails military might and economic strength. 
Secondly, major power is required to demonstrate the willingness to act and pursue 
“unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its own region or immediate 
neighborhood.” Thirdly, major power must enjoy the status attribution, which entails self-
reference and in-group attributions. Self-reference means that the political elite and people 
should view their own country as a major power. Likewise, as Weber puts it, “in order to 
be a great power, a power has to think of itself in terms of being great” (1991, cited in 
Newmann 2008, p. 130). In-group attribution means that other major powers acknowledge 
the state’s unusual capabilities and willingness to play an important role in international 
affairs and on these grounds, they recognize this state as a major power. If state meets 
minimal empirical thresholds related to these conditions, then it can be considered as a 
major power (Volgy et al 2014; Corbeta et al 2011).  Thus, according to this line of 
reasoning, Russia needs to obtain social recognition of its great power status from other 
established, ‘legitimate great powers’ and also, Russian people and political elite should 
conceive this country as a great power.  
Major Powers can be categorized into three different groups - superpower, great power 
and regional power. In Barry Buzan’s account, superpower is a country, which extends 
political, military, cultural and economic reach across the entire international system, holds 
enough capabilities to project its power globally and its superpower status is recognized by 
other states as well. Great powers lack the capabilities of superpowers, but their reach goes 
beyond more than one region. In the meantime, they must be “recognized by other states in 
the international system to be salient at the systemic level in the present or near future.” 
Finally, Buzan notes that regional power doesn’t possess capabilities of superpowers and 
“others do not ascribe them any salience at the system level and see them as relevant only 
in their regional contexts” (2004, cited in Shankar & Mahesh 2014, p. 165). Significantly, it 
is insufficient for great power to assert its status unilaterally, but other states must also 
“accord the right to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of 
22 
 
the international system” (Bull 1995, p. 196). Interestingly, Russia recognizes the Unites 
States as the sole superpower (Yuhas 2016), however, the U.S. is reluctant to recognize 
Russia as a great power and Obama even described it as just a regional power, which is 
“acting out of weaknesses” (Wilson 2016).  
Having regarded the three above-mentioned criteria, Volgy et al discern two different 
types of major power status. Major power can be viewed as status consistent, when status 
attribution of major power (recognition of its status by other major powers and self-
reference) is consistent with its capabilities and foreign policy behavior (2014, p. 63). As 
Suzuki argues, status consistent great powers can be dubbed as the ‘legitimate great 
powers’ (2008). These states share a number of commonalities, namely “they have certain 
special rights and duties to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and 
security of the international system…these states are expected to uphold the core norms of 
international society and play an active part in reinforcing them” ( Bull 1995, p. 196). 
Furthermore, status consistent, ‘legitimate great powers’ “enjoy mutual recognition as 
equals with one another” (Suzuki 2008, p. 50). By contrast, status inconsistency takes place 
either “when major power status attribution is not in sync with the capabilities and/or 
foreign policy pursuits of the state in question, or when states are inconsistent in awarding 
status to a major power” (Volgy et al 2014, p. 63). Freedman dubs this phenomenon as 
status insecurity (2016, p. 797) and Suzuki calls such state as the ‘frustrated great power’ 
(2008, p.51). Among status inconsistent powers, the authors also single out two sub-
categories: status underachiever is a major power, which is unable to enjoy status 
recognition corresponding to its capabilities and foreign policy behavior. When it comes to 
the status overachiever great power, it denotes the major power, status recognition of which 
is higher than its capabilities and opportunity to play the role of major power (Ibidem). 
With an aim to overhaul their status inconsistency problem, such major powers tend to 
engage in status competition and it might entail belligerent actions as well. Status 
underachiever major power is more prone to tackle with its status inconsistency problem by 
means of aggressive actions than the overachiever major power. The former has 
capabilities and willingness to act like a major power, therefore it is less risk-aversive than 
overachievers, which has recognition, but lacks great power opportunity/capabilities. 
Judging by Russia’s actions in post-Soviet space and its incessant demand from the 
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Western countries to respect its interests, Russia can be deemed as a status inconsistent, 
underachiever major power, which claims to lack the recognition of its great power 
privileges from other great powers. Significantly, Russia as an independent pole of a 
multipolar world is also a specific status, which requires the social recognition from other 
dominant players and in particular, the United States as a leading state within “the West” 
social category. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the available evidences seem to suggest that 
categorization of status inconsistent powers as underachievers and overachievers can be 
excessively dichotomous and unsuitable categorization to classify all major powers. For 
instance, many commentators argue that Russia lacks the necessary capabilities to be a 
great power and in the meantime, it obtains the limited status recognition from the 
established great powers. In spite of these significant deficiencies, its leadership still claims 
that Russia is a great power! Therefore, this thesis suggests that reliance on two factors 
only – capabilities and status attributes reduces the validity of indicators for measuring 
Russia’s status inconsistency problem. Moreover, formal markers of great power status, 
such as the membership in the UNSC and G8 also seem to be insufficient to measure the 
degree of social recognition of country’s great power status. The point being that, 
notwithstanding its membership in both these clubs, Russia still considers that other great 
powers do not treat this country as an equal great power and ignore Moscow’s interest. It 
lends credence to the main argument of this thesis, according to which status recognition 
and equal treatment depends on subjective, psychological perceptions of the state’s 
leadership.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s status has reasonably diminished in the 
eyes of other great powers, whereas Russia is not going to accept this and Moscow’s 
foreign policy behavior manifests the willingness to prove country’s great powerness. 
Hence, this thesis assumes that discrepancy between country’s self-perception, status-
related expectations and how this country perceives other great powers cherish its status 
can trigger the feeling of status inconsistency and instigate status-seeking behavior and 
conflict. As Hanna Smith puts it, “when the self-perception of a state is in discord with how 
the state is perceived by others, the potential for conflict grows” (2014, p. 357). Thus, 
“perceptions conflict” is underlying to the status conflict between Russia and the Western 
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great powers. In Freedman’s words “We cannot separate an actor’s status from their 
recognition, we can also not separate an actor’s status recognition from their subjective 
perception of what such recognition ought to look like” (2016, p. 816). The ‘frustrated 
great powers’ seek to convince ‘legitimate great powers’ that they also deserve to be 
recognized and in an effort to do so, they engage in ‘recognition games’ and seek to obtain 
the social recognition (Ringmar 2002, Suzuki 2008).  
Nevertheless, why status recognition is so important for countries? From constructivism 
perspective, status recognition is an essential social act for stabilizing the country’s status 
in the social order. As Ringmar underlines, “the desire for recognition is the core human 
desire, central to our sense of who and what we are” (2002, p. 119). In Wolf’s account, 
recognition of state’s status represents “a dutiful social affirmation of one's subjective sense 
of importance,” whereas non-recognition “is always seen as an unjustifiable denial of social 
rank” (2011).  Recognition can be successful, only if both sides - lower and higher status 
states agree on what constitutes status recognition and what does granting desired status 
entail ( Freedman 2016, p. 798). Suzuki argues that country is accepted into higher-status 
group, “firstly, when this country is treated as a socially equal by the existing members of 
higher-status group and second, the new member needs to be accorded the same 
constitutional privileges of other ‘legitimate great powers’” (2008, p. 48).  
Lindemann singles out four types of recognition and one of them is of particular 
importance for our study – recognition of state’s particular dignity, which implies 
acknowledgement of its special status, qualities, values, hard historical experiences and a 
right to obtain particular attention from other members of international society (2010, p. 
40). Significantly, non-recognition of state’s ‘particular’ dignity might turn into violence. 
Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe, which 
instigated a historical trauma for Russia, since its status and influence evaporated 
overnight. What is more, the West underestimated this trauma and immediately started 
disregarding Russia’s interests and historical role as a key player in the international 
system. Recognition of Russia’s great power status has the significant importance for its 
national identity as well. As Wolf highlights, “the more prominently a particular feature 
(e.g. some value, achievement, point of view, faculty) figures in a state’s identity, the more 
emphasis its leadership will put on its proper consideration…playing down some of its 
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historic achievements or denigrating one of its essential cultural values can put the very 
foundation of the group’s self-esteem into question” (2011). There is a consensus about the 
central importance of this particular feature in Russia’s state identity and therefore, its 
external validation is of paramount importance. Furthermore, social recognition of Russia’s 
status is a confirmation of its social standing and positive self-evaluation, while denial of 
recognition is a frustrating experience, which tends to undermine peoples’ sense of self-
worth. 
Nowadays, Russia can be deemed as a status dissatisfied country, which experiences 
“status déficit” i.e. political leadership believes that it deserves to be ranked more favorably 
than it is actually evaluated. Such states are prone to undertake war with an aim to change 
the beliefs of reference status community (Renshon 2016, p. 513). Renshon employed 
network-based measures of international status and the main finding of her comprehensive 
research project is following: conflict can be a feasible strategy for countries to enhance 
their status and what’s more, not only victory, but initiation of the war can lead to status 
enhancement (Ibidem). Status dissatisfied state selects a smaller target and other major 
states rarely become the direct targets of it, because in order to gain status recognition, it 
needs a victory and manifestation of its strong military capabilities. This suggestion is 
particularly important when it comes to Russia’s campaigns in Ukraine. Such status deficit 
represents the humiliating experience for a state and motivates the political elite to take 
certain measures to get away from it.  
 
Humiliation and identity management strategies  
Judging by the public speeches of Russia’s leadership, unequal treatment and disrespect 
to Russia’s interests by the Western powers is viewed in Moscow as a humiliating 
experience. Etymologically and semantically, humiliation is directly connected to status – 
“rooted in the Latin humus (earth), as revealed by humilis (low) and humiliare (to make 
low)” (Lindner 2006, as it is cited in Liu 2015). Likewise, Wolf argues that “humiliation is 
an extreme form of status denigration” and the larger is the gap between desired image 
(self-perception) and projected image by others (how other states perceive this state), the 
greater is “the frustration, humiliation and the loss of self-esteem.” If the state does not try 
to break out of this humiliation, it might significantly affect its national self-esteem. (Wolf 
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2008, 2011; Lindemann 2010). In Wolf’s account, humiliation can be provoked by “the 
denial of the social value of some specific feature which is of central importance to a 
group’s identity… by the refusal to recognize a group’s possession of a feature whose 
value is commonly accepted” (2011). In addition, humiliation as a degrading experience 
provokes certain emotions, such as ressentiment, anger, vengefulness that might have 
certain repercussions for state’s foreign policy choices and behavior. Humiliation confronts 
country’s specific rights, merits and undermines an actor’s dignity and moral qualities, 
therefore it represents the most barefaced assault on an actor’s self-respect (Margalit 1999; 
Lindner 2006 as it cited in Wolf 2011). Nevertheless, humiliation is also a subjective-
psychological matter and political leaders interpret, depict and verbally frame the specific 
situation and action as humiliation, thereafter they act upon those interpretations. By doing 
so, they might intend to mobilize people against an actor, which shows disrespect to this 
state and prepare the ground for the subsequent action. 
According to the social identity theory, humiliation caused by unfavorable social 
comparison translates into low self-esteem that can be understood as the positive 
assessment of one’s social self (Clunan 2009). Consistent with SIT/IR framework, national 
self-esteem can be enhanced by obtaining higher status or maintaining the positive 
distinctiveness from the significant ‘Other’. In an effort to do away with perceived 
humiliation and boost national self-esteem, political elites develop the national self-images 
and employ different identity management strategies (ibidem). Self-images are formed on 
the basis of two factors - political purpose and international status. As Clunan puts it, 
“political purpose includes ideas about what values, principles, traits and symbols 
characterize the country and what values and principles should govern relations between 
countries. It also conveys an idea about states mission, if there is one….international status 
includes questions of ranks, of the positioning of one’s country in an imagined international 
hierarchy of political military, social and economic power” (2009, p. 31). Based on it, this 
thesis argues that the current ruling elite of Russia promotes Statist self-image, which also 
encompasses ideas, borrowed from Eurasianism and Civilizationist self-images. The Key 
components of dominants statist self-image are inter alia: Russia as a great power, 
referring its international status; Russia as a unique state-civilization and defender of 
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civilizational diversity, denoting state’s mission; Russia as a guardian of traditional values 
and spiritualism, underlining values and principles of the state. 
Self-images also constitute certain countries and regions as desired in-groups and out-
groups (Ibidem). For instance, as long as proponents of Statist self-image argue that Russia 
is a great power and have all necessary qualities, it is a part of great power in-group. 
However, markers and criteria of great power group membership are changing over time. 
From Russia’s perspective, members of the great power group are the U.S., China, India, 
Brazil and major European players. However, although Russia sees itself as part of this 
group, its relative standing within this group is undermined by the Western great powers. In 
other words, with their behavior, they unduly refuse to recognize Russia as an equal great 
power and full-fledged member of this group. Its fragile relative standing in great power in-
group is embodied with the fact that the Western great powers are reluctant to grant 
equality to Russia and secondly, Russia feels deprived the right to enjoy privileges 
associated with the ‘legitimate great powers’ (Suzuki 2008, p. 49). Therefore, political 
leadership adopts different behavioral strategies to obtain higher recognition of its status. 
According to traditional SIT, unfavorable social comparison and the psychological need 
for positive self-esteem motivates political elites employ identity management strategies, 
such as social mobility, social competition or social creativity. There is a growing body of 
literature, where identity management strategies are applied to the international relations 
for the sake of analyzing states’ foreign policy behavior. Political leaders employ these 
strategies to achieve higher relative status for the state and to ensure positive view of 
national self (Clunan 2009, p. 75). These strategies aim to overcome group’s perceived 
negative social status, relative position on the status hierarchy and to achieve a positive 
identity by means of establishing a favorable comparison with the reference in-group and 
out-group. What is more, by pursuing these identity management strategies, political 
leadership seeks to infuse certain distinctive attributes of this country in the national Self 
and along with external recognition, they expect an approval of these attributes from their 
own people as well (ibidem). 
The state employs social mobility strategy, if it seeks admission into the higher-status 
group by dint of becoming more similar to the desired group members and for this reason, 
this state embraces higher-status group’s values and normative standards. Consistent with 
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the traditional SIT framework, the individual sticks to the social mobility strategy, when 
s/he is dissatisfied with membership into the existing social group and therefore seeks to 
join the high-status group. In case of SIT/IR framework, the state uses social mobility 
strategy, when it is dissatisfied with its existing status and wants to join the high-status 
group or institutions through normative rapprochement. Significantly, state opts for social 
mobility strategy, only when it perceives the boundaries of higher-status group as 
permeable and flexible. Indicators of social mobility strategy can be, inter alia, emulation 
of higher status group values, attempts to join political institutions dominated by members 
of the higher-status group etc (Clunan 2009; Larson & Schevchenko 2010). Hypothetically 
speaking, if Russia suddenly decides to subscribe to the Western norms, it can be a seen as 
a pattern of social mobility strategy. Significantly, Suzuki argues that in order to gain a 
recognition, great power “needs to identify with the collective social norms and rules, 
which govern ‘legitimate great power’ identity” (2008, p. 50). However, for Russia’s 
current leadership, this option is unacceptable and rejects an idea of embracing the Western 
liberal values. Larson and Shevchenko argue that Gorbatchev’s “common European home” 
can be deemed as an example of social mobility strategy, given that he tried to assimilate 
the USSR into the community composed by the Western countries (2003 p. 15).  
However, if state perceives higher-status group boundaries as impermeable, it might 
apply social competition strategy, in order to defeat and outdo its members “in the area on 
which their superior status rests” (Turner 1975). For instance, if an ability of effective 
power projection, military strength or control of the spheres of influence can be deemed as 
the significant determinants of great power status, a state will seek to compete with other 
members of great power status community on these ranking criteria in an effort to receive a 
positive evaluation from them. Therefore, social competition over status can also entail the 
conflict and violence. Significantly, conflict for material resources cannot be understood as 
a social competition and the latter denotes the competition over status only. The object of 
social competition is to improve the group’s relative position rather than to maximize 
wealth, power (Larson 2012, p. 66). Consistent with this logic, Larson and Shevchenko 
argue that arms race, competition over spheres of influence, military attack against a 
smaller state, acting as a spoiler to obstruct other’s collective efforts can serve as the best 
observable indicators of social competition for status (2010, 2014). This thesis assumes that 
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Moscow’s activities in Ukraine and Syria serve to the purpose of enhancing Russia’s great 
power status. The available evidences listed below seem to suggest that Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine is widely seen through the prism of the rivalry over the sphere of 
influence. As for Russia’s campaign in Syria, it can be understood as an attempt to obstruct 
the activities of the United States, demonstrate an ability to project its military power 
beyond its immediate region and force Washington to admit Russia’s role in settlement of 
this international crisis.  
Finally, in the classical writings about SIT, lower-status group of individuals employ 
social creativity strategy in order to maintain positive distinctiveness vis-à-vis higher status 
group on a different ranking system or dimension. Along these lines, SIT/IR authors posit 
that lower-status state seeks to change the dimension of comparison with members of 
higher-status group, given that this state considers the existing status quo as illegitimate 
and unstable. By creating an alternative dimension, it places an emphasis on its own unique 
values and contributions with an aim to make a distinction from the reference out-group 
more discernible. Indicators of social creativity can be, inter alia, promotion of new norms, 
institutions and developmental model, state’s specific mission and unique values (Larson & 
Shevchenko 2010, p. 74-75). As for the examples of social creativity strategy, these authors 
single out Gorbachev’s “moral visionary leadership” and “new thinking” (2003, as it is 
cited in Evans 2015). The social creativity strategy will succeed, if reference out-group 
admits a new value dimension and acknowledges that lower-status group really stands out 
on it (Tajfel 1978, cited in Larson & Shevchenko 2014).  
Social creativity might take three forms. Firstly, the group might try to “redefine the 
attractiveness of group attributes” (Clunan 2009, p. 35). On the state level, political elite 
“revise their interpretation of the dimension on which nations are ranked, so that 
characteristics that were seen as inferior are now presented as positive, since they acquire a 
positively valued distinctiveness” (Larson & Shevchenko 2010, p. 67).  Secondly, 
consistent with social creativity strategy, political leaders might try to alter the dimensions, 
the basic attributes for of comparison that would enable this state to claim its superiority to 
higher-status group on these new dimensions. An example of it can be the claim, such as 
for example “state A has a stronger economy than B, but state B has more fascinating 
culture”. Subsequently, political leaders try to convince and gain recognition from the 
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reference group to recognize state’s superiority on this new dimension of comparison. 
When the significant ‘Other’ acknowledges the state’s achievements and positive 
distinctiveness on the new dimension, this state actually obtains the social recognition 
(Larson & Shevchenko 2010, 74). In addition, acceptance of superiority on this new 
dimension by higher-status group can make the comparison relevant and only in this way it 
can lead to status enhancement. (Tajfel 1978, cited in Worcel et al, 2011).  In the 
meantime, the reference group is expected to recognize the state’s outstanding position on 
the new dimension, if the former is convinced that this recognition will not undermine its 
own positions (Larson & Shevchenko 2014, p. 271). However, if reference group is 
unenthusiastic to recognize accomplishment on this new dimension, it can exacerbate a 
conflict. The third type of social creativity strategy involves changing of the focus of 
comparison, i.e. change the reference group. In this case, political leaders tend to compare 
their country to the group with lower-status countries, instead of comparing with higher-
status group (Evans 2015, p. 404). The analysis in the last part of thesis explains that 
Russia is pursuing the second type of social creativity strategy. As this section underlines, 
certain perceptions affect to the decision of the political elite while choosing specific 
identity management strategies, therefore next section sets out to review these factors.  
 
Border impermeability, status hierarchy illegitimacy/instability and related emotions 
 According to the traditional SIT, individuals adopt social mobility strategy, only if 
boundaries of higher-status group are perceived as permeable and status hierarchy as 
legitimate and stable. In addition, Tajfel notes that selection of specific identity 
management strategy largely depends on the perception of status hierarchy as legitimate or 
illegitimate, stable or instable (1978, cited in Hinkle et al. 2011, p. 167). Status hierarchy 
between lower-status group and higher-status group can be perceived as legitimate and 
stable, if lower-status group believes that the existing status quo is justified and impossible 
to be changed. In other words, lower-status state recognizes the superiority of members of 
the higher-status group and they deserve to have the higher status. In the meantime, status 
hierarchy is seen as stable, when representatives of the lower-status country believe that 
they cannot alter it. If lower-status group views the status of higher-status group as 
legitimate and stable, social competition or creativity strategies are less likely to be adopted 
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by this group, because they are aware of the fact that it can hardly undermine the existing 
status quo. By contrast, when inferior groups perceive the existing status hierarchy as 
illegitimate and unstable, they tend to espouse social competition or social creativity 
strategies (Brown & Ross 1982, cited in Hinke et al. p. 170; Klippenberg 1989, cited in 
Clunan 2009, p. 35; Larson & Shecvhenko 2010, 2014; Ward 2015).  
According to SIT/IR framework, there are three conditions, under which borders of the 
higher status group are perceived as impenetrable. Firstly, when a state is unable to leave 
the low-status group and join the higher-status group. Secondly, when higher-status group 
members are unenthusiastic to accept the low-status actor as an equal player and part of 
their group. Thirdly, when lower-status state is unable to psychologically identify with 
higher-status group (Ward 2015, p. 20). From the West’s perspective, Russia’s perception 
of impermeability of great power club borders stems from its own inability to prove its 
great powerness and it is also unable to become an independent “pole”. On the other hand, 
Russia asserts that Western ‘established great powers’ deliberately limit the membership 
into this group and on this ground, they do not confer this status to Russia, while the West 
incessantly seeks to retain its dominance.  As for the status quo illegitimacy and instability, 
public statements of Russia’s political elite clearly convey the view that Russia is a 
member of great power group and deserves to be recognized as a great power.  In this light, 
the current status quo is illegitimate.  
Olga Malinova introduces one additional factor - ressentiment, which induces political 
leaders to adopt social competition or creativity strategies. In her account, asymmetric 
relationship with the significant “other” and unsatisfactory recognition of its status leads to 
humiliation and the consequent emotional reaction, that is ressentiment. As she puts it, 
“Ressentiment (not resentment) refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed 
feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these 
feelings” (Malinova 2014, p. 292). According to Meltzer and Musolf, the main features of 
resentiment complex are “protracted (chronic) character of the emotional experience, 
powerlessness to take retaliatory action against its sources, and also a sense of being denied 
what we believe to be entitled to” (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002, as it is cited in Malinova 
2014, p. 294). Thus, ressentiment is a long-term emotional reaction, generated by the lack 
of appreciation Russia’s great power status by the ‘legitimate great powers’.  
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However, unfavorable social comparison and accompanied humiliation might also 
instigate another emotion, such as - shame. In this case, people and political establishment 
tend to think that this is their own fault and do not seek to find the scapegoat for this 
problem. However, when it triggers ressentiment, political leaders always claim that others 
should be blamed for downgrading state’s status. On this ground, when they experience 
shame, it is more likely that the political elite will adopt social mobility strategy, however, 
if the unfavorable comparison triggers ressentiment, they tend to employ social competition 
of creativity strategies towards the above-mentioned in-group and out-group.  
 
Unpacking Russia’s status inconsistency, humiliation and subjective 
perceptions  
This part starts with explaining the gap between Russia’s self-perception and 
perceptions of other great powers with regard to Russia. Judging by the official statements 
of Russia’s leadership, these two are not in accord with each other that generates the state’s 
status inconsistency problem. As it was discussed in theoretical part, the latter represents 
the humiliating experience for a state and provokes certain emotions. The following part 
also examines the presence of humiliation narrative in Russia’s political discourse. Finally, 
theoretical part also reviewed perceptions of border permeability and status quo 
illegitimacy/instability and the ensuing section seeks to analyze Russia’s subjective 
perceptions in line of these factors. 
 
Russia’s self-perception as a great power and sources of its status inconsistency  
Undeniably, preat power status represents an indispensable element of Russia’s national 
identity, around which the entire political specter converges and the vast majority of 
population have faith in country’s great power destiny. Allegedly, its self-perception as a 
great power has been playing a crucial role in shaping of Russia’s national identity. In 
Clunan’s account, every nation has commonly held memories of the past self and people 
and political elites are keen to regain positive attributes they possessed in the past and it 
affects to the shaping the current aspirations, identity and interests. She dubs this 
phenomenon as a historical aspiration. Consistent with this logic, one of the central 
historical aspirations of Russia remains the retrieval of greatness it held during the tsarist 
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and Soviet eras. (Clunan 2009, 2014). Along similar lines, SIT argues that individuals 
might experience unfavorable comparison between one’s own past status and expectations 
and the present status or expectations (Tajfel 1978, p. 70). As, Freedman puts it, “while 
individuals derive self-esteem through social comparisons with their peers, they also 
engage in self-evaluation and derive self-esteem through temporal comparisons with their 
past [self]” (2016, p. 798). Thus, states use both social and temporal forms of comparison 
when it comes to self-evaluation. Zell and Alicke argue that “an unfavorable temporal 
comparison is just as detrimental to the self as unfavorable social comparison…both of 
them are the most fundamental information sources upon which the self-concept is 
constructed” (2009, cited in Freedman 2016, p. 803).   
Russia’s self-perception as a great power mainly relies on the following pillars: it holds 
veto power in the UNSC and retains the significant military might; Russia was a great 
power during the two previous centuries; it remains to be (or seeks to remain) the regional 
hegemony and leads the post-Soviet region. On these grounds, Moscow claims to have a 
legitimate right to participate in international governance on a par with the Western 
‘legitimate great powers’. This strong sense of great power entitlement lends support to 
Moscow’s assertion that Russia should be treated by other countries as a permanent great 
power, while its great power destiny provides Russia with “right of involvement” in any 
international developments or regions (Lo 2002, cited in Smith 2016).  
Nevertheless, Russia’s political leaders incessantly express their annoyance with regard 
to the fact the Western powers do not respect Russia’s great power interests. As they argue, 
one of the explicit indicators of this disrespect is the reluctance of Western great powers to 
acknowledge Russia’s historical role in European affairs, therefore Moscow remains 
excluded from the European decision-making. In other words, Russia as a great power has 
played a crucial role in ensuring the security of Europe, therefore the existing primacy of 
the main institutional arrangements in European security – NATO and the EU clearly 
exemplifies the non-recognition of its great power status. Intriguingly, participation in the 
European affairs is vital for Russia to claim that it represents a great power and not just a 
regional power. As Pynnoniemi suggests, Russia’s self-understanding of its historical role 
in Europe has two pillars: “Russia is nothing unless a great power, coupled with the 
persistent but often unrewarding  quest to be recognized by others as a great power” (2014, 
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p. 5). Russia justifies its claims regarding its indispensable role in European security by 
historical arguments. More specifically, Russia saved Europe from autocracy by defeating 
Napoleon in the 19th century. Subsequently, Russia played a key role in defeating Hitler in 
WWII, thereby it saved Europe from Fascism. Thirdly, Russia asserts that throughout 
centuries, it has been a “civilizational and physical barrier protecting Europe against the 
barbarian hordes of the East” (Lo 2015, p. 49).  In addition, Andrey Kortunov suggests that 
even though Russia is a member of many international organizations, it remains outside of 
the main linchpin organizations of post-Cold War European order. In his account, only 
NATO and the EU can be deemed as “two central institutional pillars” of this new order. 
Thus, erstwhile great power Russia “remained a peripheral power in a NATO/EU 
dominated Europe” (2016).  
Second, the failure of “reset” policy has further exacerbated Moscow’s doubts 
regarding the U.S. willingness to respect Russia’s interests. With its “reset” policy, the 
United States decided to reduce the scale of confrontation and engage with Russia on the 
basis of the interests-based pragmatism (Stent 2014). It can be argued that this policy was 
designed in a way to demonstrate more respect to Russia’s interests and obviously, it 
sought to address Moscow’s great power concerns. In this vein, Washington diminished its 
attention towards the post-Soviet states; Obama decided to keep silence with regard to 
NATO’s further eastward enlargement; the U.S. temporarily set aside its plan to deploy 
missile defense system in Eastern Europe and criticism towards Russia’s political system 
was significantly reduced. However, this policy turned out to be short-lived and failed to 
address the grounding status-related concerns of Russia, namely, “reset” policy could not 
solve problems related to security in Europe and Moscow’s marginal role in that. The U.S. 
subsequent actions, such as the renewal of working on the deployment of anti-ballistic 
system in Eastern Europe, support to the Arab spring revolutions and abuse of Russia’s 
abstention from vetoing the intervention in Libya have once again heightened Russia’s 
worries about U.S.-led unilateralism inclinations and lack of respect to Russia’s interests.   
Finally, prior to Russia’s intervention, Moscow offered Washington to cooperate and 
solve the civil war problem in Syria. As Trenin argues, Russia proposed its own terms of 
engagement, namely “Moscow and Washington act jointly and as equals; they bring the 
Syrian government and the opposition groups to the peace conference and keep them there; 
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they let the Syrians decide the future of their country and the composition of its transitional 
government” (2013). Nevertheless, the United States appeared unenthusiastic to accept 
these terms and cooperation did not come to fruition. It has reinforced the current political 
regime’s perceptions that Russia’s diminished status is caused by the unwillingness of the 
Western great powers to cooperate with Moscow on an equal basis and it is embodied with 
their “anti-Russian” behavior. Consequently, these thwarted moments of cooperation were 
perceived in Moscow as the acts of disrespect to Russia’s interests and an overt example of 
the U.S. unilateralism in international affairs. Judging by the statements of the 
representatives of Russia’s political elite and writings of many pro-Kremlin authors, such 
treatment exacerbated Moscow’s humiliation and it triggered emotions, such as 
ressentiment and vengefulness that resulted in specific responsive act from Moscow, aim of 
which was to reclaim its craved status and ensure respect to its interests.  
 
Multipolarity and Russia as an independent pole of global power 
This thesis also assumes that Russia seeks to enhance the normative aspects of its 
status. However, promoting of civilizational identity and conservative values is not directly 
linked to its great powerness. Rather, these two help Russia to enhance its status as a 
sovereign pole of great power and analysis in the last part clearly shows it. Multipolarity 
can be understood in a different ways, but from Moscow’s perspective, multipolar order 
consists of the different powerful poles, which interact to each other and solve the major 
international issues in concert. After the collapse of the USSR, the Cold War bipolar 
system has turned into unipolar order, dominated by the United States. Nevertheless, there 
is a growing support to the claim that new emerging powers challenge to the U.S. 
dominance and the multipolar order is taking shape. Significantly, Russia is one of those 
states, which tirelessly challenges to the U.S. dominance and asserts that U.S.-led unipolar 
system is extremely unstable and conflict-prone. Therefore, the world must become 
multipolar, where Russia will be one of the independent centers.  
 In Russia’s understanding, “multipolarity is based on a “global oligarchy,” whereby a 
few major powers collectively manage world affairs, with smaller states playing only bit 
parts (Trenin 2011, as it is cited in Lo 2015, p. 76). Interestingly, Moscow does not intend 
to invent a new order, but instead it prefers to restore the old one, similar to the Concert of 
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Europe (Ibidem). In the Kremlin’s account, that system had certain advantages, such as 
major powers were unwilling to dominate over each other not to undermine the status quo; 
none of the major powers wanted to intervene in the domestic or regional affairs of another 
power and Russia’s concerns related to its independence were not as acute as it is today. 
The current U.S. unilateralism has heightened Moscow’s worries related to interference 
into Russia’s domestic affairs. As Moscow argues, the United States moral authority and 
liberal values challenge to the stability of many societies around the world. Based on it, the 
best way to guarantee Russia’s sovereignty is to limit America’s unilateralism by means of 
enhancing Russia’s own international stature. As for the independence, as Bobo Lo puts it, 
it “can denote self-reliance, as in reduced dependence on Western governments and 
organizations, which are consequently unable to exercise significant leverage on 
Moscow…. independence is about preserving national sovereignty against those who 
would seek to deny or limit it… It also propagates Russia’s “unique” persona as an 
autonomous international actor” (2015, p. 48-49).  
Based on her the comprehensive analysis of up to 90 Russian texts about Russian 
identity, Marina Pukeliene concludes that Russia’s unique civilizational discourse does not 
correlate with its great power identity discourse. Rather, advocates of civilizational 
discourse propound the view that Russia should regain its special status and return its 
respectful place in the international system (Pukeliene 2014, p. 54). Therefore, we should 
start the empirical analysis in the last part based on the premise that civilizational and 
conservative discourses are supposed to reinforce Russia’s status as independent centre in a 
multipolar world. In order to clarify the differences between these two, I should argue the 
following: acceptance of Russia as an independent center in a polycentric world would 
mean recognition of its great power status as well, however, not all recognized, ‘legitimate 
great powers’ can become the independent poles. To be more precise, in Russia’s view, the 
Western great powers jointly compose one, the Western pole dominated by the U.S. 
Intriguingly, The West’s unwillingness to grant Moscow its “proper place” in international 
arena also represents the main cornerstone of its humiliation narrative, which will be 
discussed in details in the next section (Shevtsova 2015).  
There are certain indicators demonstrating Russia’s aspiration to become a sovereign 
pole. As its 2013 foreign policy concept argues, “International relations are in the process 
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of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international 
relations… The ability of the West to dominate world economy and politics continues to 
diminish….the global power and development potential is now more dispersed” (Ministry 
of foreign affairs of Russian federation 2013).This statement indicates to Russia’s intention 
to take a new role in the new international system that would enhance its international 
standing. Moreover, based on his analysis, Urnov found out that “the number of negative 
characteristics of the world political system mentioned in FPC 2013 reached 30 in 
comparison to 14 in FPC 2000” that clearly indicates to Russia’s dissatisfaction  with the 
current international order and willingness to change its positions therein (2014, p. 311).  
FPC also expresses Russia’s desire to maintain independence in a multipolar world and 
stipulates that Russia foreign policy is based on “developing mutually beneficial and equal 
bilateral and multilateral partnership relations with foreign states, interstate associations, 
international organizations and forums on the basis of respect for independence and 
sovereignty.”   
Thus, Russia’s status inconsistency problem stems from two major factors –other 
‘legitimate great powers’ refuse to recognize its great power status and the West sticks to 
its unilateralism and Russia is not entitled to act on an equal footing and independently in 
international affairs. As theoretical part argued, such unfair treatment instigates the 
humiliation syndrome of the country and the subsequent section investigates, whether it is 
present in Russia’s public discourse.  
 
Humiliation narrative in Russia’s official and public discourses 
According to social constructivism, truth and meanings are constructed by different 
actors and meanings do not exist in a real world, rather, actors create them based on their 
social interactions with the outer world (Gray 2014). As this theory posits, “the reality 
consists of people’s subjective experiences of the external world and is constructed through 
social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared meanings” (Myers 2009, 
cited in Antwi & Hamza 2015 p. 218). Consistent with social constructivism, researcher 
prefers to comprehend the world by means of examining the subjective experiences and 
subjective feelings of different actors, because reality is constructed based on these two. 
Political actors develop meanings and promote them in a public discourse in order to instill 
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these social creations into people as being real, thereafter they have certain policy 
consequences.  
Russia’s humiliation narrative and ‘Weimar Syndrome’, allegedly triggered by the 
West’s disrespect of Russia’s interests and status, represent the patterns of the social 
constructs. Multiple actors, such as politicians and scholars put forward the humiliation 
narrative in the public discourse by consistent and widespread framing to make it central in 
the public discourse. Russia’s ruling elite believes that the Western great powers remain 
reluctant to acknowledge Russia’s great power interests and after the demise of the USSR, 
the West incessantly disparages its status. Such treatment is viewed in the Kremlin as a 
humiliating experience and intriguingly, Russia’s humiliation narrative has become the 
central motif in its foreign policy since 2012 (House of Lords 2015, p. 20). As the analysis 
below shows, different authors construct the meaning of the current situation as Russia’s 
humiliation and what’s more, this subjective meaning is negotiated socially and 
historically. This section examines the presence of humiliation narrative in Russia’s foreign 
policy discourse and demonstrates how different actors put forward it.  
In the eve of Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2008, former president of Russia, 
Dmitry Medvedev publicly underlined that “We will not tolerate any more humiliation, and 
we are not joking” (Uhler 2014). This statement indicates that its humiliation narrative is 
not novel and after the annexation of Crimea, Putin’s speeches exposed the view that 
Russia’s humiliation syndrome remains present. One of the staunchest supporters of 
Russia’s humiliation narrative is Sergey Karaganov, who asserts that in the post-Cold war 
period, Russia was incessantly treated like a defeated power, the West cornered Moscow 
and continued its containment policy instead of acknowledging Russia’s interests. 
However, Russians do not see themselves as losers and such treatment was perceived as the 
West’s firm position that “Russia should know its restricted and reduced place in world 
politics” and eventually, such attitude turned into Moscow’s “Weimar syndrome” (2014). 
After the annexation of Crimea, Karaganov claimed, “Russia set a limit of creeping 
military, economic and political expansion in the space of its privileged interests, in fact, 
the Versailles policy of "velvet gloves", which provoked a feeling of humiliation and the 
desire for revanche within a large part of the elite and the people” (Karaganov 2014). 
Along similar lines, Alexei Arbatov notes, “Russia was being treated as a losing power [by 
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the West], although it actually dealt the final blow to the Soviet empire and the Cold War” 
(Arbatov 2014, cited in Shevtsova 2015). Dmitri Trenin likewise claims, “to Putin, 
the West has historically been trying to hold Russia down for fear of competition” (2014, p. 
6). The Russian economist, Igor Yurgens also mentioned in 2014, “Both Putin and his 
closest circle are overcome with feelings of humiliation and betrayal” (2014). Finally, as 
Putin pronounced with irritation in 2014, “it looks like the so-called ‘winners’ of the Cold 
War are determined to have it all and reshape the world into a place that could better serve 
their interests alone” (Kotkin 2016). These pronouncements make it clear that Russia’s 
alleged humiliation was triggered by the disrespect of the Western great powers towards its 
interests and ambitions. 
As these commentators argue, unfair treatment and consequent frustrating social 
comparison was seen by the political elite as a humiliating experience, which provokes 
certain emotions, such as ressentiment and vengefulness. Political leadership tries to solve 
this problem and they engage in upward status competition in order to secure the desired 
social recognition of their status. Social identity theory also outlines a number of factors, 
which influence political leader’s decision to adopt a particular strategy and the ensuing 
section analyzes how Russia arrived at the decision to adopt specifically social competition 
and social creativity strategies.  
 
Impermeability of higher-status group boundaries , status quo illegitimacy and instability 
Russia’s current ruling elite perceives the boundaries of the great power group as 
impermeable, because the Western great powers remain unwilling to acknowledge Russia’s 
aspirations and interests. In addition, from Moscow’s standpoint, the West is unwilling to 
accept Russia as an independent center of a global power, since the United States reinforces 
its unilateralism. However, why Russia thinks that the Western powers deliberately limit 
membership in this club? In order to answer this question, we need to discuss the specific 
normative criterion, which hindered the recognition of Russia’s great power status by the 
Western great powers in the past and still remains relevant to a significant degree.  
As it was already mentioned, status consists of material and normative components, 
meaning that when the state wants to be recognized as a great power based on its material 
capabilities, its claim need to be backed up by certain normative credentials. In the 
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meantime, it is hard to define, which of them is more significant to obtain the status 
recognition, thus they should be viewed as inter-complementary. Iver Newmann chose the 
particular regime type as a key criterion, which caused Russia’s exclusion from the great 
power ranks during the 18th century. More specifically, this regime type is an indirect rule 
of governance, which replaced the pre-existing forms of governance and laid the 
foundation to the relatively liberal forms of governance. Consequently, it was recognized 
as a stable social practice and became a common standard of Western civilization. On the 
other hand, it widened the gap between the Western countries and Russia, since the latter 
did not embrace this novelty, the reason of which was a lack of liberal traditions and 
unsuccessful reforms. Since Russia failed to implement this civilized form of governance, 
its standing as a great power has been significantly undermined in the eyes of the Western 
great powers (Newmann 2008). 
Nevertheless, Newmann’s line of reasoning, in particular the indirect rule criterion can 
be considered as explicitly Eurocentric and the author himself admits that this logic was 
relevant in the context of a specific time in the past. However, other passages from his 
works are still pertinent for this thesis. Firstly, material and normative aspects are the 
significant constituencies of status, whereas they separately do not represent the sufficient 
attributes for status recognition. In other words, material capabilities can no longer be 
deemed as a sufficient condition for the state to be recognized as a great power and 
normative aspects have also become crucial in this regard. Second, the Western major 
powers expect from Russia to ensure a certain degree of social compatibility with the West, 
if it wants to be conferred an equal great power status. In this vein, if Russia continues to 
reject prevalence of liberal order in the international system, the Western great powers will 
become more prone to keep Moscow’s outside of the great power ranks. Furthermore, 
promotion of ‘good domestic governance’ is seen by the Western great powers as one of 
the great power duties (Suzuki 2008, p. 51). Obama’s recent comment gives credence to 
this argument - he has warned U.S. President-elect Donald Trump “to stand up to Russia if 
the country does not follow American “values and international norms”” (Moore 2016). 
Newmann concludes that if the Western civilizational standards and liberalism will be 
strengthened in future, Russia will face more difficulties to gain the social recognition of its 
status (2014, p. 111). Russia’s ruling elite claims that the West must respect its values, 
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inasmuch as they are not inferior to that of Western values. However, the Western major 
powers’ insistence that liberal credentials are essential for country’s great power status 
recognition is perceived in Russia as impermeability of this group. Nowadays, Russia finds 
itself in fundamental opposition to the norms and values, which constitute the legitimate 
membership in the great power group, given that ‘legitimate great powers’ are engaged in 
the promotion of democratic governance, human rights etc. (Suzuki 2008, p. 52). As we 
will see in the last part of this thesis, Russia rejects an idea to attain the higher status and 
independence in the existing dominant normative structures.   
Secondly, when state is incapable to join the higher-status group because of its own 
internal shortcomings, it can be also viewed as border impermeability. Westernizers in 
Russia assert that the main reasons of its exclusion are “Russia’s lack of Western political 
and economic credentials and the destructive legacy of the Soviet militarized economy and 
its Messianic mission” (Clunan 2012, p. 7). Kotkin suggests that Moscow’s inability to join 
the West was caused with the fact that Russia could not relinquish “country’s abiding 
great-power pride and a sense of special mission”. Its sense of exceptionalism and inability 
to adapt to the new reality and changed position did not allow Russia to join smaller 
countries in Europe on an equal basis (2016, p. 6). Significantly, joining the European 
institutions on an equal basis with other European countries is perceived in Russia as 
relinquishing Russia’s great power mantle, a rejection of its intrinsic historical aspiration 
and distinctiveness from other European countries. As long as great powerness represents 
the significant component of its identity, political elites are reluctant to make any 
concessions in this regard. Thus, even if the Kremlin is well aware of the main internal 
obstacles, it still has the only one option – to blame the Western great powers for its 
exclusion.  
Russia’s perception of border impermeability has been further exacerbated by the 
West’s determination to rule out Russia’s equal participation in the European decision-
making structures. Considering Russia’s historical role in the security of Europe, leaving it 
outside of these arrangements is viewed in Moscow as illegitimate and the source of its 
humiliation. Furthermore, Moscow has tried many times to do away with its marginal 
status and regain its say over European affairs. In doing so, Russian leaders initiated a 
number of proposals, such as the New European Security Treaty, institutional cooperation 
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between NATO and the CSTO as well as between the Eurasian Economic Union and the 
European Union. However, Moscow’s these endeavors appeared to be fruitless, because as 
its leadership argues, the West turned down these proposals and keeps reinforcing NATO 
and the EU, as the dominant institutional arrangements in Europe (Kortunov 2016). In this 
vein, Putin claimed in 2014, “Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues 
in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want 
to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw 
no reciprocal steps” (2014a).  Failure of “reset” policy and the U.S. reluctance to cooperate 
with Russia over Syria have further aggravated Russia’s perception of border 
impermeability. Thus, according to Russia’s subjective perception, the Western major 
powers deliberately neglect its interests and refuse to recognize its great power status.  
The unequal treatment from the West is completely unjustified and illegitimate for 
Russia, which aspires to regain the centrality in the world order and perceives itself as a 
great power with legitimate interests in European and other international affairs. Moscow’s 
inferiority is considered as highly illegitimate, as it is the result of the U.S. endeavor to 
keep Russia subordinate and disallow it to reclaim the status it deserves (Lukyanov 2016). 
As Putin said during his Crimea speech, “they [Western powers] have lied to us many 
times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact” (2014a) 
Furthermore, for the Kremlin, Russia’s humiliation is an explicit evidence of status quo 
illegitimacy. As Cohen claims, “A softer version of the Treaty of Versailles was imposed 
on the country….Russia was told in no uncertain terms that it would play a modest role in 
the world….great nation’s dignity and interests had been trampled” (2014). 
 Russia also aspires to become the sovereign and central actor in the international 
system, however, Putin claims, “They [the West] are constantly trying to sweep us into 
a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we 
call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy” (2014a). The Kremlin also 
challenges the validity and prevalence of liberal norms in international relations and Russia 
portrays the U. S. -led promotion of these norms as a source of instability in many 
countries in the world. Therefore, the West’s endeavor to introduce these values as a 
foundation for the status allocation in the international system is completely illegitimate 
and unacceptable for Moscow. As for the instability of status hierarchy, the following 
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statement from FPC 2013 demonstrates that Russia’s sees the current hierarchy as unstable 
and changeable: “International relations are in the process of transition, the essence of 
which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations… The ability of the 
West to dominate world economy and politics continues to diminish….the global power 
and development potential is now more dispersed” (Ministry of foreign affairs of Russian 
federation 2013). Given these circumstances, Russia believes that this is the right moment 
to enhance its international standing. 
 Finally, above-mentioned comments of Russian political leaders expose the presence 
of emotional reaction – ressentiment that in Malinova’s account also plays an important 
role in selecting the specific identity management strategy (2014). According to Taylors 
definition, “French term ressentiment is a feeling experienced when one group takes 
another group as an example or model but then feels angry and frustrated when it is unable 
to meet the standards, whether objectively or subjectively, of the exemplary unit” (2015, p. 
5). Sergey Medvedev draws the direct links between ressentiment and status aspirations, 
arguing that “resentment is considered to be a feeling of hostility to the fact that the subject 
considers the cause of the failures (to the "enemy"), impotent envy, mind the futility of 
trying to improve its status” (2014).  Along similar lines, as Mikhail Yampolskii puts it, 
“for Putin, the source of its ressentiment is non-recognition of Russia as an equal and 
respected player on the world stage” (2014). Indeed, Putin commented on the Ukraine 
crisis and argued that “if you compress the spring to its limits, it will snap back hard. You 
must always remember this”. (Pynnoniemi 2014, p. 6). 
To recap the last part briefly, it showed that three factors – border impermeability, 
status quo illegitimacy/instability and ressentiment are present in the mindset of Russia’s 
political leadership that are the plausible preconditions to assume that in order to improve 
its status, the Kremlin tends to adopt the social competition and creativity strategies. Based 
on it, the subsequent section seeks to explore the indicators of social competition strategy 
in Russia’s foreign policy conduct followed by examining the indicators of social creativity 
strategy in its civilizational and conservative turns. If these indicators are present, we can 
argue that these events served to the purpose of reinforcing Russia’s international status.  
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Russia engages in social competition strategy  
This part provides an analysis of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and Syria and 
examines as to whether these campaigns can be deemed as part of Russia’s social 
competition strategy towards the Western great powers, driven by Moscow’s higher status 
aspirations. With this aim, it intends to investigate, whether indicators of social competition 
strategy are explicitly present in Russia’s campaign in Crimea followed by its intervention 
in Syria.  As SIT/IR posits, by employing social competition strategy, state acknowledges 
superiority of higher-status group on a certain criteria and seeks to change its negative 
ranking by dint of competing with the representatives of this group on these dimensions 
(Clunan 2012, p. 11). Undeniably, the behavior of the Western ‘legitimate great powers’ 
reveals the fact that their great power status still heavily relies on traditional, material 
components, such as control of spheres of influence, holding extensive military capabilities 
and the ability to project their hard power in a far away regions, unilateral decisions related 
to international crises etc. (Larson and Shevchenko 2010, p. 71). Thus, the analysis below 
seeks to examine, if campaigns in Ukraine and Syria expose Moscow’s intention to 
compete with the Western great power on these traditional criteria of great power status 
with an aim to revamp its unfavorable standing in the great power group.  
 
Annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation 
Evidently, Russia’s foreign policy conduct sticks to the traditional great power school 
of international relations - it uses hard power and does not shy away from generating 
conflict to securitize its sphere of influence. The analysis below suggests that Russia social 
competition strategy in case of Ukraine crisis has three main tenets, such as competition 
over spheres of influence with the Western great powers,  showing off its improved art of 
war by waging a new generation of warfare and legal competition in interpreting the 
international law. 
 
Geopolitical competition over sphere of influence with the Western great powers  
The available evidences seem to suggest that Moscow’s engagement in Ukraine can be 
viewed as a traditional rivalry with other great powers over the sphere of influence. The 
point at issue is that the conventional understanding of great power status always entails 
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dominance in one’s neighborhood/region (Aron 1998, cited in Lo 2015, p. 48). As Hast 
notes, throughout the history, great powers have sought to “promote stability and order in 
the international system by means of tacit understandings, which underpinned the 
management of regional spheres of influence”. (2014, cited in Berryman 2014). Similarly, 
the dominant definitions mark out the great power as a state, which is able to maintain its 
own sphere of influence using economic and military capabilities and is granted droit de 
regard (right to access) by other great power in this area (Ranke 1989, cited in Newmann 
2014, p. 89). Hurray also highlights that “regional preponderance should represent an 
important element of any claim to major power status…a state may see the region as a 
means of aggregating power and fostering a regional coalition in support of its external 
negotiations” (2006, p. 8).  Remarkably, not only Russia seeks to delineate its sphere of 
influence, but also all major powers apparently want to ensure that neighboring countries 
will not align with their rivals. Correspondingly, Russian political elite believes that by 
orchestrating the ‘Maidan revolution’, the U.S. and the EU disregarded Russia’s special 
interests in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, Ward notes that encroachment to the sphere 
of Russia’s “privileged interests” by the West was “the most important manifestation of 
Russian demotion from the ranks of the major powers” (2014). It is worth underlining that 
regional dominance is also the main cornerstone of the appreciation of Russia as a one of 
the dominant cores of global power. As Lo asserts, “just as the United States leads the 
West, and China “heads” Asia, so Russia’s credibility is seen to be contingent on 
dominating its part of the world” (2015, p. 48). As long as post-Soviet area represents the 
domain of Russia’s Great Power interests, it can even employ military power to uphold 
these interests. Russia’s political establishment strongly believes that without sphere of 
influence, it would cease to exist as a great power. Intriguingly, Nitoiu defines the EU’s 
growing presence in the post-Soviet space as an endeavor to enhance its status (2016, p. 
146). In this vein, Russia also views the EU as a geopolitical project, which seeks to 
broaden its sphere of influence to the East. In short, any attempt of other external powers to 
obstruct Russia’s dominance is immediately understood as an attack to its great power 
identity that translates into ressentiment and ‘narcissistic’ injury.  
Non-interference into its backyard and recognition of its privileged interests in this 
domain represents the main cornerstone of Russia’s effort to secure equal treatment and 
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respect from the Western great powers. What is more, Russian-led integration projects in 
post-Soviet area can be viewed as an institutional reinforcement of its dominance. Whereas 
12 percent of text in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept 2000 is devoted to CIS countries, this 
number has increased up to 22 percent in FPC 2013. Similarly, integration in the CIS space 
was mentioned twice in FPC 2000 and this number has increased up to eight in FPC 2013 
(Urnov 2014, p. 313). In Allison’s account, by snatching Ukraine out of Russia’s influence, 
the latter would be deprived an opportunity to assert itself as the European great power 
(2014, p. 3). After all, Putin’s one specific statement after Crimea’s annexation has 
confirmed that this campaign  was mainly about regaining respect and recognition for 
Russia: “Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war 
and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international 
affairs; it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected” 
(2014a). Thus, as long as competition over sphere of influence is one of the indicators of 
social competition strategy, Moscow’s Crimea campaign can be deemed as part of this 
strategy, thereby Russia pushed the West to respect its great power interests in its 
neighborhood.  
 
Demonstrating Russia’s ability to conduct a new generation of warfare  
As it was mentioned in the theoretical part, social competition is always about status 
and status-seeking behavior, which might also turn into an overt conflict. As Vlahos 
argues, “throughout history, people have tended to ascribe “great power” to states that stage 
successful operatic military productions — full of action and drama — for a world 
audience” (2015). He goes so far to suggest that aggressive behavior increases chances of a 
state to get its great power status recognized by others. Great powerness is a fading status, 
especially if it is challenged by other powers and the war is a possibility to renew it 
(Ibidem). Victorious wars must be displayed to the international audience through Grand 
National ceremony, with the “investiture of great power” (Ibidem). Remarkably, WWII 
victory parade in the Crimean port of Sevastopol in 2014 can serve as the best example of 
great power investiture by Russia.   
 In Renshon’s account, violence is one of the available options for attaining a higher 
status by dint of altering beliefs and perceptions of other states. (2016, p. 527). As long as 
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these beliefs are rigid and do not change overnight, unexpected and resonant events, such 
as war can speed up this process. In order to successfully influence on community’s beliefs, 
violence should be “highly public (visible to all actors in the community), dramatic or 
salient (to capture the attention of potential observers), and convey unambiguous 
information”. Secondly, the target country does not need to be equally powerful, but 
waging war against smaller and weaker state can also work as a status-altering event. 
Finally, the status - seeker state needs to demonstrate that it has new capabilities (military 
and other) to impress the reference community (Ibidem). The ensuing section sets out to 
investigate whether Crimean crisis meets all these three conditions that lend credence to the 
claim that this event can be conceived as a status-seeking behavior and part of social 
competition.  
Judging by far-reaching international responses, the annexation of Crimea can be 
apparently deemed as highly public. To begin with, the UN General Assembly passed a 
non-binding resolution, thereby Crimea's Moscow-backed referendum was declared as 
invalid (Reuters 2016). Second, NATO condemned Russia's incursion into Ukraine and 
assessed it as a violation of international law (Williams 2014). Congress of the Council of 
Europe also denounced the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol (Consulate general of 
Ukraine in Shanghai). Finally, the United States and the European Union imposed 
extensive sanction regime on Russia. Allegedly, this event was also dramatic for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the annexation of Crimea was a blatant breach of the Helsinki 
final act, affirming states’ respect for territorial integrity, national sovereignty, peaceful 
settlement of conflicts and non-intervention in internal affairs. In fact, with its action, 
Russia infringed all these principles (Foreign policy news 2014).  Second, Russia violated 
article 2 §4 of the UN Charter, which obliges states to uphold principles of inviolability of 
state borders, territorial integrity and non-use of force (Robert Schuman Foundation 2015). 
Thirdly, Russia abandoned its commitment to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
violated Budapest memorandum. Additionally, annexation of Crimea has emerged as a 
dangerous precedent. Using the protection of Russian-speakers’ rights as a pretext for 
justifying its intervention, Russia has heightened worries of the EU member countries with 
extensive Russian minorities. Violation of Ukrainian borders has also significantly shaken 
the foundations of European security and post-Cold War European order. Finally, 
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annexation of Crimea by Russia is completely unambiguous fact and in addition, political 
leaders alluded many times that the annexation of Crimea is the result of the West’s bad 
behavior. In addition, Putin admitted the presence of Russian military servicemen in 
Ukraine (Walker 2015). However, even without Putin’s admission, there are abundant 
evidences that prove Russia’s presence in Ukraine (see Čech & Janda 2015). Consistent 
with Renshon’s a second point, Russia chose a smaller state as its target, given that status 
enhancement does not necessarily requires waging a major war against other great power. 
Russia took an advantage of the growing domestic turmoil and vulnerabilities of Ukraine 
and Crimea turned out to be an easy target because of a sizeable number of ethnic Russians 
living there. Thus, Moscow used this opportunity to signal about its status ambitions.  
Finally, consistent with the social competition strategy, Russia demonstrated that it was 
able to conduct the new type of warfare and exposed certain novelties in this regard.  As a 
consequence, NATO has come to realize that its conventional superiority might seem 
inadequate to withstand Russian-led “hybrid war”. In addition, the Crimean annexation 
aimed at demonstrating that Russia has significantly upgraded its warfare strategy after 
2008. The real innovation was the way Russia combined its military tools with non-military 
coercive means to psychologically demoralize the enemy. Bruusgaard’s report enumerates 
the main military novelties in Russia’s grand strategy in Ukraine (2014). To start with, 
Moscow has effectively used its covert special operation forces in conjunction with civilian 
self-defense forces with an aim to prepare the ground for “plausible deniability”. Secondly, 
Moscow has successfully transferred its overt high readiness forced into covert in order to 
maintain control on the entire peninsula without triggering a dramatic escalation. Thirdly, 
by dint of non-contact warfare and managed violence, Moscow was able to control the 
level of escalation and leave opportunity for Ukraine to escalate. Last but not least, in this 
asymmetric warfare, Russia has successfully employed all available political, economic 
and informational means against the enemy. As a consequence, the Crimean operation 
displayed a remarkably improved strategic coordination among Russia’s different 
bureaucratic divisions comparing to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war (Ibidem). Thus, Russia’s 
campaign in Ukraine was consistent with the social competition strategy, given that 
Russia’s actions meet all above mentioned indicators for status-seeking behavior. What is 
more, its political leadership highly appreciates the effective use of its power in 
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maintaining Russia’s international status and as Lo claims, modern great power must be 
able to use different forms of power capabilities in an impressive manner (2015, p. 47). 
 
Legal competition and interpretation of international law 
It is a well-known fact that Russia always tries rhetorically to stay as a “law abiding 
actor”, which respects the international law. This “feeling of responsibility” forced it to use 
a legal rhetoric to manifest that its actions in Eastern Ukraine had the legal basis. It comes 
as no surprise that due to its non-binding nature, not all countries are equal in front of 
international law and above all, great powers breach it with their actions. As Krisch notes, 
great powers feel tempted to interpret the international norms about the use of force in 
international relations to vindicate their bellicose actions (2014). Remarkably, when one 
great power interprets the international law and uses it as a legal camouflages for its 
activities, other great powers feel ressentiment with that, therefore, when particular great 
power uses certain vagueness in international law at its advantage, other great powers 
consider that undermined balance can be restored with the same action. As Lo puts it, “The 
Kremlin interprets international law as, essentially, the body of rules and conventions that 
govern relations between the major powers and, through them, smaller states as 
well…geopolitically, international law à la Russe serves to restrain the exercise of 
American power” (2015, p. 95). Although Ukraine is a sovereign state and entitled to 
choose its foreign policy vector independently, its freedom of choice is limited, when it 
runs against the interests of a great power. In fact, Moscow one more time deprived the 
right of unilateral interpretation of norms to other ‘legitimate great powers’. As Putin 
stated, “Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided 
by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come 
to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism” (2014a). 
Roy Allison gathers a number of legal justifications, uttered by Russia during and after 
its intervention in Ukraine. To begin with, Russian Duma authorized the use of force in 
Ukraine upon extraordinary situation, which entailed protection of endangered Russian 
citizens, compatriots and military personnel, stationed in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. On 
this ground, it invoked the right of self-defense under the Article of the 51 UN charter. 
Although there were no sufficient evidences to invoke this article, Russia followed the suit 
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of the Western countries, which had carried out rescue operations without approval from 
the government of the second state. The second legal claim was intervention upon 
invitation of Ukrainian authorities, but as international lawyers argue, Yanukovich could 
not invite Russia to intervene, inasmuch as he had been already deposed from his position 
(Wisehart 2014). As Allison puts it, Russia also interpreted the law and relied on previous 
cases of intervention, especially in western Africa, which were based on the consent of 
dismissed governments. Thirdly, Russia referred to the human protection claim, which 
became the basis for Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. (2014, p. 1259) Thus, if the West 
recognized Kosovo’s self-determination on the basis of human protection claim, Crimea 
secession from Ukraine was also legal. In his speech, Putin argued, “We keep hearing from 
the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so 
special in the eyes of our colleagues? This is not even double standards; this is amazing, 
primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their 
interests” (2014a). Thus, this legal rhetoric demonstrates that Russia competed with the 
West and other European countries in interpreting the international norms. In Moscow’s 
view, unilateral interpretation of international law by the Western powers undermines 
Russia’s positions as an upholder of these norms and makes it inferior to the West, thus its 
use of legal camouflage for Crimea’s annexation intended to settle a score  (Ibidem).  
Finally yet importantly, status-related emotional factors also played a significant role in 
Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. These emotions were instigated by the West’s 
disrespect to Russia’s great power interests in its zone of influence. The annexation of 
Crimea by Russia was largely “driven by psychological impulses and highly emotional 
responses to a situation”, given that the Kremlin saw the need to somehow respond to 
Yanukovich’s overthrow (Mendelson & Harvey 2014). Along similar lines, Richard Sakwa 
underlines that it was “an angry and ad hoc response to the events in Kiev” (2014). The 
political commentator Stanislav Belkovsky argued that the annexation of Crimea was “a 
redemption of its own humiliation by the West and not something like pragmatism based 
defense related decision” (2015). Finally, Triesman argued that “annexation of Crimea was 
an impulsive decision that Putin stumbles into” and a response to the unexpected fall of 
Yanukovych (2016). 
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To summarize this part about Ukraine, intervention in Ukraine served to the purpose of 
strengthening Russia’s sphere of influence and signaling to the Western countries that 
Russia’s privileged interests therein should not be neglected. In Moscow’s view, each great 
power exerts influence on its own sphere of influence and other big countries should 
abstain from meddling into each other’s neighborhood. Besides, Russia demands an equal 
footing and sharing of responsibilities over security in Europe with other great powers and 
this crisis was a manifestation of Russia’s uneasiness caused by the encroachment of the 
Western institutions to its “zone of interests”. Annexation of Crimea was a clear signal of 
Moscow’s willingness to return to the stage as a great power. Second, annexation of 
Crimea enabled the Kremlin to show off its ability to wage a new type of warfare and even 
more, NATO’s conventional superiority vis-à-vis Russia has been exposed as unable to 
placate the heightened worries of Eastern European countries with regard to Russian-led 
“hybrid warfare”.  
 
Alternative explanation –annexation of Crimea as a security-seeking act 
One might legitimately ask – why Russia’s campaign in Ukraine should be seen as a 
status-enhancing behavior and not as a security-seeking act? It is worth to explicitly 
underline that status-seeking and security-seeking are not mutually exclusive and “when 
describing the state’s motivation, in which the co-varying among psychological regulators 
such as humiliation, fears and misperception are very probable (Liu 2015). However, I will 
introduce a number of arguments to prove that, when it comes to Russia’s campaign in 
Ukraine, status-seeking motivation outweighed security-seeking. To start with, Russia’s 
ressentiment complex related to Ukraine was triggered by the EU’s decision to sign the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine and it was not connected to NATO-Ukraine relations. 
What is more, although other countries in the post-Soviet region have also signed AA with 
the EU, there are no available evidences to argue that it has significantly improved their 
prospect for NATO membership. Russia’s political leadership clearly understands that the 
EU cannot threaten its security, but Russia’s regional influence can be spoiled by the EU’s 
penetration into the post-Soviet space. Secondly, widespread false allegations as if NATO 
was planning to base its ships and missiles in Crimea were merely part of Russia’s 
propaganda - this idea has never been proposed, suggested or discussed within NATO and 
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the Kremlin was well-aware of it (NATO 2016). Furthermore, before the ‘Maidan 
Revolution’, this country had the non-block status and Russian troops had appeared in 
Ukraine even before Ukrainian politicians started making the public statements about 
revocation of this status (Triesman 2016). Thirdly, with its annexation of Crimea and 
subsequent assertiveness, Russia helped NATO to invigorate its function and the alliance 
has reinforced its Eastern flank, that is the most significant boost to its collective defense in 
decades (Ibidem). NATO’s leaders agreed on a Readiness Action Plan (or RAP) during the 
Summit in Wales, based on which, NATO increases the number, size and complexity of its 
exercises. On logical grounds, if NATO is really perceived by Moscow as a danger, 
Russia’s security situation has been further deteriorated with its annexation of Crimea, 
because its actions put alliance on alert and pushed to redirect its attention towards Russia. 
Thus, these points and an analysis of Russia’s social competition strategy seem to suggest 
that annexation of Crimea was a status-seeking behavior rather than security-seeking.  
   
Russia’s intervention in Syria  
On the eve of the Ukraine crisis, certain commentators argued that Russia was just 
strengthening its positions in the immediate neighborhood and it was not intended to 
expand its influence outside of post-Soviet region. Furthermore, Mark Urnov jumped to the 
conclusion that Russia’s self-assessment as a great power has lost its salience across the 
political establishment and Moscow decided to concentrate on regional interests only, thus 
having abandoned its great power aspirations, Russia was trying to become a firmly 
established regional power (2014, p. 305). Nevertheless, shortly after the Ukraine crisis, 
Moscow made an unprecedented move and first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia, it 
sent troops outside of post-Soviet region. It could be argued that Syrian campaign is a 
rational continuation of Crimean crisis, inasmuch as with an aim of preserving its 
accomplishments in Ukraine, Russia saw the need to broaden the scope of its assertiveness 
beyond its zone of privileged interests that would enhance Moscow’s global role (Bishara 
2015, p.2). As Lukyanov puts it, “having drawn a line in Ukraine, Russia decided that the 
next place to put down the iron fist would be Syria” (2016 ). 
Similar to the Crimean case, the Kremlin validates its intervention in Syria based on the 
traditional principles prevalent in the great power politics. That is to say, major powers 
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ought to solve international conflicts by means of multilateral diplomacy, state sovereignty 
is paramount and inviolable from an act of aggression by powerful players and major 
powers share responsibility and need to find common ground in the fighting against the 
global threats. Although it is a great hypocrisy that Russia depicts itself as an honest 
upholder of these principles, Moscow’s criticism of the U.S. activities in the Middle East 
revolves around the allegation related to infringement of these principles that triggered the 
need of Moscow’s interference in Syria. The succeeding chapter outlines three main tenets 
of this intervention and seeks to examine, as to whether Russia’s actions are consistent with 
pursuing of the social competition strategy aimed at enhancing its great power status. To 
start with, Moscow intended to challenge the U.S. dominance in the Middle East and to 
coerce Washington to work with Russia on an equal basis with regard to Syrian conflict 
settlement. Second, Russia sought to enhance its presence and relevance in the Middle 
East. Thirdly, Russia was intending to demonstrate its readiness and ability to project hard 
power beyond the post-Soviet space.  
 
Seeking Russia’s role in the international crisis settlement 
Russian political establishment is extremely irked by the U.S. unilateralism in the 
international affairs and Washington’s intention to topple down the Assad’s regime was 
perceived in the Kremlin as an explicit pattern of its unilateralism. Against this backdrop, 
the ongoing developments in Syria seem to suggest that Russia is challenging to America’s 
unilateralism that embodies the first pillar of its social competition strategy. Two days 
before Russia started a military campaign in Syria,  President Putin declared in front of the 
UN General Assembly that, “it is not about Russia’s ambitions, but about the recognition of 
the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world. What we 
actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by 
ambitions” (2015). Russia’s great power aspirations incites this country to signal that it has 
legitimate interests outside of its immediate region and on this ground, Moscow sought to 
coerce the United States to recognize it as an indispensable player in international conflict 
settlements. As Putin wrote, “The United States has developed a peculiar understanding of 
security that is fundamentally different from ours. The Americans are obsessed with the 
idea to secure the absolute vulnerability for themselves.…. However, absolute 
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invulnerability for one country would mean absolute vulnerability for all the others. From 
this perspective, it is impossible to be accepted” (Putin 2012a). Moreover, when other 
major powers pay no heed to Moscow’s interests, the Syrian case has clearly demonstrated 
that Russia is ready to obstruct their effort in international conflict resolution on their own 
terms. In Putin’s words, “Russia has practically always enjoyed the privilege of carrying 
out an independent foreign policy and it will continue to do so. Moreover, I am convinced 
that world’s security can only be achieved together with Russia, rather than by endeavor to 
“push” it, weaken its geopolitical positions or cause damage of its defense capabilities” 
(Ibidem). Thus, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to drastically alter the strategic 
balance in Syria and complicate the Unites States’ policy to achieve its goals. At one point, 
Russia has managed to improve its positions in Syria so that the United States came to 
acknowledge that it could no longer disparage the Moscow’s role in the settlement of the 
Syrian crisis. As Richard pipes argued back in 2009, “When the Kremlin says ‘no’ to 
Western initiatives, Russian’s feel that they are indeed a world power” (2009). 
In addition to this, the Kremlin argues that the Arab revolutions in the Middle East 
were instigated by Washington and not by poor governance in these countries. Thus, the 
recent turmoil in the Middle East is the West’s fault and the U.S. has failed to eliminate 
chaos it created in the region. In this light, Russia seeks to portray itself as a better 
alternative reinstating the regional stability, thereby it tries to undermine the picture of the 
U.S. as a reliable partner in the eyes of regional political elites. Given that the majority of 
them are autocratic regimes, Moscow’s support to Assad is a clear message that if America 
decides to poison these societies with ‘colour revolution’, Russia will stand by them to 
lambast the chances of such revolutions to succeed (Stent 2016). In the meantime, Syrian 
campaign has helped Russia to do away with its post-Crimea isolation. To put it bluntly, 
Russia was isolated, because nobody wanted to talk and do business with its leadership. 
However, by intervening in Syria, Moscow compelled the United State to get back to the 
negotiating table and talk with Russia. Thus, Russia’s campaign in Syria can be deemed as 
part of its social competition strategy, aimed at outdoing the U.S. unilateralism in 
international crisis management.  
 
Russia’s increased military presence in the Middle East 
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The second pillar of Russia’s social competition strategy entails offsetting the U.S. 
extensive presence by Russia’s military build-up in the Middle East. Following its 
intervention in Iraq in 2003, America has substantially enhanced its positions in the Middle 
East and finally, it emerged out as the dominant external power in the region. However, the 
available evidences seem to suggest that Russia’s great power ambitions is somewhat 
incompatible with the U.S. extensive dominance in the Middle East as well. More 
specifically, Russia’s naval doctrine, released in 2015, gives a growing importance to the 
Mediterranean Sea basin and views it as part of the Atlantic vector, thereby Russian navy 
intends to balance NATO (Adamsky 2015). Moreover, the doctrine stipulates that Russian 
armed forces must turn the Mediterranean region “into the zone of military-political 
stability,” by means of maintaining “sufficient permanent military-naval presence” there 
(Ibidem). Russia’s decision to maintain a major forward operating base in the Middle East 
will enable Moscow to influence on the subsequent developments not only in Syria, but 
also in the entire region (Stacey 2015). In August 2015, Russia signed a deal with Syria, 
which allowed Moscow to open the Khmeimin air base close to the Latakia city. In 
addition, Moscow signed a deal with Syria, according to which it obtains the right to keep 
forces in this country “indefinitely” (Presstv 2016). At present, Russia possesses four naval 
and air bases in Syria, while the exact number of ground forces operating there is unknown. 
Finally yet importantly, Moscow has also announced about its intention to get permission 
from Syria to deploy its naval-facilities on a permanent basis. Thus, as Stephen Blank 
suggests, “Russia has constructed the foundation—if not something more—for a long-term 
presence of combined-arms forces” (Blank 2016). With its extensive military build-up in 
the Middle East that is not the traditional region of its dominance, Russia explicitly signals 
about its status aspirations.  
 
Demonstrating Russia’s improved  military capabilities and ability of power projection  
The third pillar of Russia’s social competition strategy in Syria entails demonstrating 
Russia’s readiness and ability to project its power outside of the post-Soviet region. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western great powers have used their military capabilities 
on a multiple occasions all around the world. As Dmitri Trenin puts it, “by intervening in 
Syria, Russia undermined the de facto monopoly of the global use of force that the United 
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States has held since the collapse of the Soviet Union” (2016). Military power projection 
has assisted Russia to reveal that, notwithstanding the Western sanctions and economic 
difficulties, it can still effectively uphold its interests using hard power capabilities outside 
of “zone of interests.” It comes as no surprise that Russia’s political elite believes that its 
military reach needs to be bigger than just the protection of Russia’s national borders, 
therefore Syrian conflict enabled them to show off strong military capabilities as one of the 
central factors to prove its great powerness. After successful “hybrid war” in Ukraine, 
Syrian campaign enables Russia to demonstrate its missile capabilities including cruise 
missiles and strategic forces. In the aftermaths of establishing an army base in Latakia, 
Russia undertook air operations against Syrian opposition groups using a series of near 
missiles. Moreover, Russian missiles were launched against targets in Syria from the Black 
Sea. As Sumantra Maitra argues, only several great powers are capable of doing so and 
what’s more, Moscow’s ability to launch strikes from such a distanced location is 
particularly indicative, given the chronically poor condition of its navy after the collapse of 
the USSR (2016). He adds that the Syrian crisis has definitely proved Moscow’s ability to 
successfully project its hard power “in a small and rapid capacity” beyond the post-Soviet 
space (Ibidem). 
Russia’s military build-up in Syria and the worsened situation on the ground, infused 
Washington to negotiate with Moscow. During mid-2016, Secretary of State John Kerry 
met Vladimir Putin to discuss military cooperation agreement, outlining the framework for 
coordination of American and Russian air attacks against ISIS. This plan entailed the 
creation of a joint military command center for information sharing, coordination of 
bombing campaigns and the minimization of accidental conflicts danger between Russian 
and U.S. aircrafts (Harris & Barnard 2016). Significantly, this plan has not fulfilled yet, 
however, Washington’s decision to cooperate with Russia can be conceived as recognition 
of Russia’s legitimate role in Syrian conflict and acknowledgment of the significance of 
coordination with Moscow to defeat ISIS. 
In September, Russia and the United States announced the subsequent ceasefire 
agreement in Syria. As Lavrov stated, this agreement “is not the end of the road and the 
way; that is just the beginning of our new relations” (U.S. department of State 2016). In 
Hiro’s account, this was the first time after the demise of the Soviet Union that “Russia 
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managed to put itself on the same diplomatic footing as the U.S.” (Hiro 2016).  
Nevertheless, this truce turned out to be short-lived and it was thwarted in the aftermath of 
Aleppo bombing by Russian forces. However, it has not been the first unsuccessful peace 
deal this year and both parties might get back to the negotiation table again, since other 
alternatives to ensure long-lasting stability do not seem to be viable. Given this 
background, the United States can no longer exclude Russia from the final conflict 
settlement processes, simply because it seems unattainable without Moscow’s participation. 
After these developments, Obama claimed that “the bottom line is that we think that 
Russia is a large, important country with a military that is second only to ours, and has to 
be a part of the solution on the world stage rather than part of the problem” (The White 
House 2016). 
Finally yet importantly, similar to the crisis in Ukraine, particular emotions have also 
played their role in Russia’s decision to intervene in Syria. The U.S. decision to overthrow 
Assad’s regime irrespective of Russia’s firm opposition generated the latter’s fear of 
“symbolic vulnerability” and provoked ressentiment. According to Lindemann, the state 
might engage in the international crisis out of fear for the survival of its identity and not for 
the sake of material or political incentives (2010, p. 86). To be more precise, its 
involvements conveyed an idea that Russia’s great power status constitutes certain interests 
in global affairs that require recognition from other major powers. Being an obstinate 
upholder of the principle of non-interference into state’s domestic affairs and sovereignty, 
Russia reacted in order to save its face as a defender (at least rhetorically) of this principle 
when Yanukovich’s regime was overthrown and Assad’s regime appeared on the verge to 
follow the suit. As a matter of fact, Russia’s intervention in Syria was an attempt to 
dissuade America to keep undermining Assad’s positions. What is more, Major General 
Igor Konashenkov sent a warning signal to the United States, bluntly informing that if the 
latter attacks territories held by Assad’s regime, it will be deemed by Moscow as an 
immediate threat posed to its military servicemen and as a response Moscow can launch its 
S-300 and S-400 anti aircraft missile systems (Oliphant 2016). This statement clearly 
expresses Russia’s ressentiment complex.  
To recap, Russia’s social competition strategy is manifested in its Syrian campaign in 
the following ways: Moscow intended to save its great power’s face and gain recognition 
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from the United States as a central and equal player in the settlement of this crisis. For this 
purpose, Russia sought to obstruct the U.S. policy in Syria and attacked Assad’s opposition 
forces. With its increased military presence, the Kremlin signaled about its status ambitions 
and sought to outweigh the United States, restore power balance in the region and show off 
its improved military capabilities as a sign of great powerness. Putin has also managed to 
survive its client Assad’s regime and shifted the balance of power to Russia’s advantage in 
the region.   
 
Alternative explanation – Russia’s campaign in Syria was a security-seeking act 
Similar to the Ukraine case, there are certain arguments to prove that security concerns 
were not the primary determinants of Russia’s invasion into Syria. To start with, there are 
plenty of evidence confirming that Russia’s primary targets in Syria were America-backed 
Assad’s opposition and not ISIS. Indeed, Assad’s regime benefited the most from Russia’s 
intervention, because thanks to Moscow’s assistance, it restored control of the significant 
part of the country’s territory, while moderate opposition has been significantly weakened 
(Czuperski et al 2016). This fact clearly indicates that the main aim Russia’s incursion was 
survival of the Syrian regime and not defeat of ISIS. 
Last year, a group of countries, such as France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States issued a joint statement on the Russian 
intervention in Syria.  With this declaration, these states “express our deep concern with 
regard to the Russian military build-up in Syria and especially the attacks by the Russian 
Air Force on Hama, Homs and Idlib, which led to civilian casualties and did not target 
Da’esh. These military actions constitute a further escalation and will only fuel more 
extremism and radicalization” (Turkey’s Ministry of foreign Affairs 2015).  Shortly after 
this declaration, the U.S. spokesman, John Kirby announced that “Greater than 90% of the 
strikes that we’ve seen them [Russia] take to date have not been against ISIL or al-Qaida-
affiliated terrorists” (The Guardian 2016).  Based on it, one might ask – if Russia intention 
was to eliminate the terrorism danger, why it targets Assad’s opposition and not ISIS? This 
behavior reconfirms that Moscow’s main goal in Syria is to survive Assad’s regime and 
signal that Russia aspires to play the leading role in world affairs and is no longer willing to 
play the secondary role. 
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Secondly, there is a growing support to the claim that Russia’s campaigns in Ukraine 
and Syria aimed to gather support to Putin’s regime and distracting people’s attention from 
the mounting economic problems. In my view, this factor is also directly connected to its 
international status. As it was mentioned in theoretical part, status consists of two aspects – 
self-reference and in-group recognition. Self-reference implies that people should perceive 
this country as a great power and their perceptions largely depend on state’s external 
behavior. In this regard, these two campaigns have significantly helped Russia to enhance 
the self-reference part of its status and the following figures can work as a proof of it. To 
start with, the number of people, who considered Russia as a great power, has increased 
from being 48% in 2012 up to an unprecedented number – 68% in 2014. Second, in 2012, 
9% of Russian’s were very proud of Russia’s political influence in the world, while 37 
percent were somewhat proud. These numbers in 2015 have increased up to 22 % and 46 % 
respectively. In 2012, 22% of the population was very proud of the Russian armed forces, 
whereas this number in 2015 reached to 40% (Levada 2014). Hence, these figures show 
that Russia enhanced its self-reference as a great power and in the meantime, regime 
obtained an increased degree of loyalty.  
 
Russia engages in social creativity strategy  
As we already know from theoretical part, political leaders can adopt a mixture of the 
different identity management strategies, because they are not structurally determined 
(Clunan 2009, p. 35). In addition, dominant self-image in the country constructs different 
regions and countries as in-groups and out-groups, thereafter political elite pursues 
different identity management strategies towards them. The previous part argued that 
Russia’s campaigns in Ukraine and Syria were consistent with social competition strategy. 
This part analyzes Russia’s conduct of social creativity strategy towards the partial out-
group - the West and investigates how Russia reinforces the normative aspects of its status. 
Consistent with Pukeliene’s study, Russian official discourse about its civilizational 
identity and value distinctiveness does not intend to reinforce normative dimensions of its 
great power identity as such. Rather, it seeks to enhance Russia’s status as an independent 
centre in a multipolar world (2014). 
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Nowadays, Russia considers the United States as its main opponent in establishing the 
multipolar order that makes the interests of these two countries incompatible, because U.S. 
unipolarism erodes Russia’s international status. It is worth to note that the from Russia’s 
perspective, the United States represents the leading force within the Western civilization 
and other Western great powers align to this country. Based on it, the West represents a 
higher-status group for Russia and it can be defined as its out-group, from which it strives 
to maintain a positive distinctiveness. In what follows, we will examine, how political 
leadership uses discourse about Russia’s civilizational uniqueness and value distinctiveness 
in order to enhance its international standing. Thus, Russia’s status seeking behavior in 
Putin’s third term can be described as an amalgamation of social competition (Ukraine and 
Syria) and social creativity (civilizational and conservative turns) strategies.  
According to the traditional SIT theorists, members of a group with a lower self-esteem 
pursue social creativity strategy, thereby they “seek positive distinctiveness for this group 
by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 
cited in Evans 2015, p. 404). Likewise, political leaders pursue social creativity strategy, 
when they shift to a new dimension of comparison with the reference out-group that would 
enable them to present their country as distinctive and superior from the significant ‘Other’. 
Remarkably, normative and cultural inferiority to the West turns into the deficit of respect 
towards Russia as an equal and independent player that also triggers humiliation and 
exacerbates ressentiment (Morozov 2015). Hence, this chapter suggests that after Putin’s 
return to power, Russia introduces a new dimension of comparison with the West, that is 
the civilisational uniqueness. In the meantime, Russian Orthodox Church, closely 
connected to Russia’s leadership, sets up a new mission for Russia - defender of the 
traditional values worldwide. The political elite wants the West to acknowledge Russia’s 
distinctiveness on this scale of comparison (civilizational and value differences) that would 
enhance its international standing. However, if the West refuses to appreciate Moscow’s 
distinctiveness based on these features, it might trigger a new wave of ressentiment in 
Russia.  
Status consists of tangible and intangible components and there is a growing body of 
literature, which argues that along with conventional/material attributes of status (military, 
economy, demography etc), country also needs to encompass outstanding normative 
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features, for example, cultural achievements, civilizational attributes, norm 
entrepreneurship etc. Iver Newmann’s study concludes that during the previous centuries, 
Russia’s non-recognition problem was caused by the lack of Western norms, while its 
military strength turned out to be insufficient for recognition (2008). Curanović also 
considers that “in attributing status, countries take into consideration not only the material 
potential of an aspiring country, but also its commitment to the values and principles shared 
by the dominating actors” (2015, Suzuki 2008). However, Russia is reluctant to embrace 
Western values and prefers to prove its value distinctiveness. Russia’s social creativity 
strategy rests on two pillars mainly: firstly, Russia is a unique state-civilization and 
guarantor of civilizational diversity; Russia’s conservative values and superior to the 
Western values and this country is the last bulwark of traditional values. Russia still argues 
that its conservative values are truly European, but drastically different and superior to that 
of the Western values. 
For Russia, the West represents the most important significant ‘Other’. As Stepanova 
suggests, “In Russia for centuries, the role of the ‘Other’ as something different from ‘us’ 
thus making ‘us’ ourselves, was assigned to ‘the West’ (2015, p. 128). However, the recent 
Statist discourse in Russia shows that the West is not only the ‘other’, but also the ‘enemy’, 
which causes bad things and threatens Russia’s identity, integrity etc. As Vilho Harle puts 
it, “The Enemy emerges if and only if “we” and “they” are thought to be fundamentally 
different, that is, when the distinction is understood to reflect the struggle between good 
and evil, and when good is associated with “us” but evil with “them”’ (2000, as it is cited 
in Stepanova 2015). As long as the terms such as “the West” and “Europe” are sometimes 
misleadingly used as interchangeable, Malinova singles out the main distinction between 
these two - “Russia is usually seen as a part of Europe (though in varying senses), but it 
hardly could be considered an actual part of “the West”” (2014, p. 292). Along similar 
lines, Russia asserts that is values are different and superior to that of Western values, but 
Western values are not synonym with European values. The matter is that Russia portrays 
itself as a true defender of European values, while the Western countries have abandoned 
them (Morozov 2015; Curanović 2015). In this light, “the West” denotes the liberal and 
materialistic part of Europe, plus the United States, which can be dubbed as “false” Europe. 
As for Russia, it is a part of other, true Europe or anti-liberal Europe, which defends the 
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true and authentic European values and sticks to the different path of development. The 
West and Russia as other Europe represent two different “civilizational grammars” 
(Laruelle 2016).  
As it was mentioned in theoretical part, the dominant statist self-image borrows 
narratives from other self-images (Civilizationism, Eurasianism) that are quite salient, 
when we analyze Russia’s social creativity strategy. As Laruelle argues, main features of 
Eurasianism are narratives about Russia’s irreducible national specificity, cultural autarky, 
a religious and political messianism. (2008, as it is cited in Smith, 2015). Civilizationists 
argue that Russia is a unique civilization, which has its “mission” (Ibidem). Exactly these 
elements are incorporated in today’s Statist self-image and political elite extensively uses 
them to lay the solid foundation to its social creativity strategy. This part of the thesis 
assumes that re-emergence of discourse on Russia’s identity, as a distinct state-civilization 
serves to the purpose of drawing the clear lines between its unique and the Western 
civilizations with an aim to enhance its independent standing in a multipolar world. 
 
Russia as a unique state-civilization and defender of civilizational diversity 
Discourse about civilizational uniqueness re-emerged in political elite’s vocabulary 
already in 2012, when in his speech, Putin explicitly underlined that preservation of state’s 
civilisational identity is an important task for the state. (2012b). As Linde puts it, “the state 
makes up the historical basis of, and is inseparable from, the civilisation in question. The 
civilisation and the state are envisioned as being so intimately connected as to be 
practically indistinguishable” (2016, p. 24). This claim lends credence to Putin’s statist 
view, according to which strong state is vital to reinforce civilization and vice versa, strong 
civilizational identity underpins state’s strength. Tsygankov defines civilization as 
“historically (re)produced and relatively stable structure of national meaning, [which] 
represents a set of culturally distinct values that are reproduced across time and space.” 
(2016, p. 147)   
After 2012, Russia’s political leadership increasingly underlines the civilizational 
identity and traditional values, while speaking about the current world order. In his address 
to the Federal assembly in 2012, Putin argued, “In the 21st century, against the background 
of a new alignment of economic, civilisational and military forces, Russia must be 
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a sovereign and influential country. We should not just develop with confidence, but also 
preserve our national and spiritual identity, not lose ourselves as a nation” (Putin 2012c). 
With this statement, president exposed its view, according to which, along with military 
and economic capabilities, civilizational attributes has evolved as signifiers of international 
competition. Similar line of reasoning can be traced in the following sentence from Russia 
foreign policy concept, released in 2013: “For the first time in modern history, global 
competition takes place on a civilizational level, whereby various values and models of 
development start to clash and compete against each other” (The Ministry of Foreign 
affairs of the Russian federation 2013). Unlike the pre-existing bipolar system, current 
competition takes place between states, which belong to different civilizations and given 
this background, Curanović notes that “a state’s self-identification in terms of civilization is 
thus an attribute of its power status” (2015, p. 12). Furthermore, during the meeting of the 
Council for interethnic relations in 2012, Putin underlined that Russia’s a unique world 
civilization nature represents country’s “great competitive advantage” (Putin 2012d).  
As Russia’s political leadership believes, multipolarity must be based on the existence 
of several independent “poles”, composed by the major powers and such system can 
effectively constrain the U.S. unrelenting aspirations towards global hegemony. As long as 
the true multipolar system has not come into existence yet, the West is inclined to 
administer international affairs on the basis of its liberal norms. As Putin underlined, “This 
period of unipolar domination has convincingly demonstrated that having only one power 
centre does not make global processes more manageable. On the contrary, this kind 
of unstable construction has shown its inability to fight the real threats such as regional 
conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, religious fanaticism, chauvinism and neo-Nazism” 
(Putin 2014). Given this background, Putin asserts, “under these conditions, Russia can and 
should play an outstanding role, dictated by its civilizational model, a great history 
geography and culture of its genome” (Putin 2016e). Therefore, Russia understands that if 
it wants to establish an effective multipolarity, where Russia will play a key role as an 
independent “pole”, it needs to boost the alternative normative attributes, which in the 
meantime will distinguish it from the dominant Western civilization. In Linde’s words, “the 
framework emphasizing civilizational diversity can be regarded as the cultural equivalent 
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of multipolarism, which was otherwise concerned with hard-power capabilities” (2016b, p. 
611).  
During Medvedev’s presidency, discourse about Russia’s belonging to European 
civilization has gained momentum. As he announced, “I am certain that we cannot resolve 
Europe’s problems until we achieve a sense of identity and an organic unity between all 
of its integral components, including the Russian Federation. Having cast aside the Soviet 
system and any idea of its restoration, Russia has laid the foundations of a state that is 
completely compatible with the rest of Europe…. The end of the Cold War made it 
possible to build up genuinely equal cooperation between Russia, the European Union 
and North America as three branches of European civilization” (2008). Along similar lines, 
Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 stipulates that “Russia stands ready to play a constructive 
role in ensuring the civilizational compatibility of Europe” (The President of Russia 2008). 
It is easy to notice that by placing emphasis on civilizational compatibility, Russian 
leadership aimed at obtaining an equal status from the United States and European powers 
by pursuing the social mobility strategy. However, after the failure of its rapprochement 
with the West, Russia opted for social creativity strategy and after Putin’s return to power, 
Russia is experiencing “civilizational nationalism”, which denotes the situation, when 
national identity is framed in civilizational terms for poorly political purposes. (Pain, as it 
is cited in Linde 2016b) As Linde suggests, placing an emphasis on cultural and 
civilizational distinctiveness from the West can serve as the best illustration of state-
sponsored “civilizational nationalism” (Ibidem).  
As we already know, state pursues social creativity strategy, when state highlights its 
own superiority in cultural, civilizational, moral terms and its political leaders argue that 
these criteria are becoming more important for evaluation that other, conventional criteria 
for higher status allocation. Russia’s unique civilizational discourse has particular traits, 
which are used by different commentators to underline its superiority comparing to the 
Western civilization. To start with, as it is mentioned in the 2013 foreign policy doctrine, 
Russia is “a multiethnic and multi-religious state, with historic experience of the 
harmonious coexistence of different nations, ethnic groups, and faiths, which is well 
equipped for dialogue and inter-civilizational partnership” (The ministry of foreign affairs 
2013). An unmatched scale of ethnic and linguistic diversity coupled with affluence of 
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different confessions render Russia a state-civilization and furthermore, it is unique 
inasmuch as no single country or civilization can enjoy the same degree of diversity. Given 
this background, Russian civilization is more coherent and therefore superior to the 
Western civilization, because despite such diversity and multiculturalism, it is a 
harmonious civilization, whereas the West encounters difficulties with regard to ethnic 
minorities (Kosachev 2012, cited in Pukeliene 2014, p. 38). Thus, its superiority lies in its 
outstanding tradition of harmonizing a variety of ethnic and religious groups. As Putin 
alluded, unlike Europe, Russia has never experienced religious wars or crusades 
(Curanovic 2015, p. 13). Secondly, Russia’s civilization is better than Western civilization, 
since it respects other traditional civilizations, whereas Western civilization seeks to prevail 
internationally and disrespect other civilizations (Ibidem). Significantly, the last claim is 
used by Russia to speak with other traditional civilizations and build a real multipolarity. 
Thirdly, it could be argued that respect to other traditional civilizations renders Russia a 
defender of civilizational diversity that also embodies the social creativity strategy in a 
sense that it highlights a completely new role for Russia in a multipolar world. Finally yet 
importantly, Russian unique civilization has features, such as collectivism, communality, 
collegiality, patriotism, whereas the West is associated with notions such as exploitation, 
manipulation, egocentrism, and focus only on material goods and all these values are  
destructive (Mikhailov 2013, Bogachev 2013, cited in Pukeliene 2014). As it was stated 
above, social creativity might entail acts, such as turning positive characters of the 
significant “other” into negative. As long as Russia is unable to catch up with the West in 
terms of economic development, Moscow vilifies its advantage, saying that such capitalist 
system is immoral and excessively focused on obtaining economic incentives. In addition, 
Western secular civilization adheres to liberalism, secularism and individualism, while 
Russia sticks to traditionalism, moral and religious principles. Putin also claimed that “It 
seems to me that the Russian people, or, to speak more widely, people of the “Russian 
world” civilization, the first thing he thinks of is that there is some higher moral principle. 
As for the Western values, they say that a person is himself, focused on personal success 
only. We think differently…[Russian person] can die for his friends, for his people, in 
contemporary language, for their country” (2014b). Finally, as it becomes clear from 
Pukeliene’s analysis on different identity discourses in Russia,  “constructing Russian 
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identity as of separate civilization gives it certainly a special status… and unique position 
in international arena” (2014, p. 46). Thus, re-emerged civilizational discourse serves to the 
purpose of inverting the U.S. dominated unipolar system into the truly multipolar world by 
virtue of introducing Russia as a superior and real upholder of civilizational diversity and 
constraining other major powers to abuse this system.  
 
Russia as the last bulwark of traditional values  
As Hurrel claims “states can improve their social status by articulating alternative sets 
of values which other states can rally round, thus creating an anti-hegemonic coalition in 
which to claim leadership status”. (2006, cited in Suzuki 2008, p. 60). As Russian 
commentators argue, Christian traditional values ensure coherence and unity of Russia’s 
unique civilization, these values lie at the heart of Russia’s civilizational identity, therefore 
ruling elite and ROC promote traditional Christian values and portray Russia, as defender 
of the traditional values worldwide. In Laruelle’s account, this messianic narrative has 
universal significance and represents a transcendent idea of Russian civilization, which 
bears a portion of divine truth and disappearance of which will leave all mankind 
impoverished (2014, p.1). These values are listed in the 2015 state educational strategy - 
humanity, justice, honor, conscience, personal dignity, faith in the goodness and 
willingness to assume moral duty towards themselves, their family and Fatherland. (2015, 
p.3). Russia criticizes the West, because it abandoned moral values and derailed from its 
Christian roots.  As Putin claimed, “We see a lot of Euro-Atlantic countries chose the path, 
which leads them to the rejection of their roots, including Christian values that form the 
basis of Western civilization. [We see] the denial of any moral principles and traditional 
identity: national, cultural, religious or sexual” and losing spiritual principles leads to its 
moral degradation (Putin 2013). The West aggressively tries to impose its wicked model to 
the entire world (Ibidem).  
Intriguingly, Putin conceives high morality and spirituality of society as the main 
determinant of state’s strength, arguing that “we must be strong militarily, technologically, 
economically, but still the main thing that will determine the success - it is the quality of 
people, intellectual, spiritual, moral quality of society. After all, economic growth and 
prosperity and geopolitical influence - is derived from the state of society itself” (Ibidem). 
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In addition, based on the analysis of Putin’s pre-election articles published in 2012, Hanna 
Smith concludes that the common denominator in these seven articles was Putin’s intention 
to remind the society that “Russia’s international status comes from national unity and 
pride” (2015). Significantly, advocating the traditional values by the government also 
enhances the national unity, while positive distinctiveness from the West on the basis of 
different value system is supposed to enhance the national pride, i.e. self-esteem.  
There is a growing support to the claim that Russia’s conservative turn has quite 
significant foreign policy dimension. As Laruelle underlines, Russian conservatism “is a 
tool for international consumption: for the first time since the collapse of Marxism, Russia 
is offering the world a narrative that goes beyond its national specificities, has universal 
value, and thus can be accepted, integrated, and reinterpreted in other contexts” (2014, p 6). 
Moscow seeks to use its traditional value discourse in order to undermine the neo-liberal 
hegemony in the international system. In this vein, Russian political elite advocates the 
view that interstate relations should be conducted on the basis of traditional values. As 
Sergey Lavrov stated in 2012, “I am convinced that the moral values that are common to all 
world religions, should remain the basis of purely human relations, and at the heart of 
world politics” (Ria Novosti 2012). Subsequently, he asserted that “advocates of ultra 
liberalism require revision of moral and ethical values that undermines effort to establish a 
stable system of global governance” (Interfax 2014). Finally, the closest supporter of the 
Kremlin in defending moral values is patriarch Kirill, who also expressed his opinion with 
regard to Russia’s sovereignty and argued that Russia’s spiritual sovereignty is “the highest 
degree of asserting the sovereignty of Russia as a unique country-civilization” ( 
Sharafutdinova 2014, p. 618). Similarly, Trenin argues, “the centerpiece of Russia’s new 
foreign policy is winning full sovereignty and fundamental to this vision are conservative 
values, rooted in the Orthodox Christian tradition” (2014, p. 1). 
Russia’s introduction of conservative values into the international politics can be 
understood as an attempt to create a doctrine and to give a meaning to “voice of Russia” 
internationally and primarily, against the U.S. unilateralism. In addition, it enables the 
Kremlin to communicate with non-Western emerging powers, which also feel irked by the 
Western imposition of its model (Laruelle 2014 p. 2). As Vladimir Putin once argued, 
unipolar world system threatens the “God-given diversity of the world” (2013). 
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Significantly, Russia’s agenda on strengthening multipolarity by forging ties with non-
Western great powers is fully in sync with its traditional discourse, which also entails 
maintaining tight ties with other “traditional” civilizations. (Curanović 2015, p. 7). As 
Anderson suggests, “the common feature of conservative Christian movement is their 
patriotic commitment – a belief that their nation is special and perhaps has a mission to 
spread their values to a wider world” (2014, cited in Stepanova 2015, p. 132). Russia’s 
political leadership introduces its conservative ethical values as the better alternative of 
liberalism in international politics and by doing so, they seek to introduce the new criterion 
for status allocation that would enable Russia to enhance the positive ranking in the 
international arena (because Russia portrays itself as being more ethical actor). However, 
as we will see in last part, Russian-led traditional ethical values are only instrumental and 
have quite slim chances to prevail. 
Russia’s traditional value discourse is fully consistent with social creativity strategy. To 
start with, as SIT/IR argues, by adopting this strategy, state “aims to redefine the 
attractiveness of existing group attributes or create new ones…it involves contesting the 
validity and legitimacy of existing criteria for status allocations” (Clunan 2009, p. 35). It 
also entails shifting the social comparison with higher-status group on a new dimension. 
Russia’s social creativity strategy is exemplified with statements of its political leaders, 
according to which, the West and its liberal values are becoming dangerous for other 
societies (because they spark unrests) and they are losing their moral superiority. Hence, 
these values should no longer be considered as valid criterion for status allocation and need 
to be replaced. In the meantime, Russia creates the new status attributes for itself, claims to 
find a new role – the last bastion for protection of traditional values, and seeks recognition 
of this new role from the Western societies first.  As Putin claimed in 2013, “we know that 
in a world, more and more people support our position on defending traditional values, 
which for millennia were the spiritual and moral basis of civilisation in every nation” 
(2013b). Russia cooperates with conservative forces in the West, given that their 
recognition is of significant importance for Russia (Morozov 2015). Significantly, Russia 
protects not only conservatism internationally, but also it portrays itself as a savior of 
Europe. As Kosachev puts it, Russia “understands itself in a role of equally competent 
savior of common European spiritual heritage. If we use technical parallel, then our state 
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offers itself as a kind of ‘backup server’, ‘boot CD’ with all the main programmes (values) 
in case, when main server or computer is attacked by ‘virus’ and it will be needed to restore 
it in its initial form” (2013, as it is cited in Pukeliene 2014).   
To summarize this part, Russia’s civilizational turn and conservative surge exemplify 
the social creativity strategy in a sense that Russia seeks to assert its superiority based on 
the civilizational uniqueness and value distinctiveness from the West. With these actions, 
Russia seeks to reject claims about the universality of the Western civilizational standards 
and highlights its distinctive civilizational identity from the West. As Linde puts it, “in 
regard to the values dimension, the civilisational approach essentializes differences, and 
represents in this sense an ideology of separativeness that can be used as a means of self-
distinguishing and, concurrently, of Othering” (2016b, p. 27). He adds that Russia’s new 
morality and emphasis on its cultural values is an attempt of cultural self-determination to 
achieve self-sufficiency. Just as Putin has been trying to "de-offshorize" the Russian elite, 
he is now launching what could be called a "moral de-offshorization" (Galleoti and Bowen 
2016). If Ukrainian and Syrian cases showed that Russia competed with other great powers, 
its social creativity strategy - highlighting civilizational uniqueness and conservative values 
serve to the purpose of self-improvement to establish itself as an independent centre in a 
multipolar order. Furthermore, Russia considers that superior moral values and 
civilizational uniqueness are more important criteria to be compared with the West, rather 
than economic standards or democratic norms (Evans 2015, p. 28). If integration into the 
Western economy was viewed as a viable option to retain its great power status during 
Putin’s first term in 2000s, the current government no longer expresses enthusiasm to 
enhance its status through this way. Russia questions the existing criteria for status 
allocation on which it is inferior to the higher-status group and seeks to invent the new 
criteria for comparison that is one of the most important indicators of social creativity 
strategy.  
 
The main weaknesses of Russia’s social creativity strategy  
Although Russia might want to achieve the cultural self-sufficiency and total 
independence from the West by virtue of promoting traditional values and civilizational 
distinctiveness, this strategy still suffers from the structural shortcomings. Morozov 
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develops several arguments to claim that conservative turn and definition of idea of 
civilization have clearly exposed Russia’s normative dependence on the West and 
intriguingly, it can significantly curtail Moscow’s effort to become a completely 
independent actor in a multipolar world. As he argues, Russia seems unable to portray itself 
as “a substantial alternative to Western neoliberal hegemony… the rejection of hegemonic 
values are not matched by any positive agenda” (2015, p. 121). Promotion of traditional 
family values is characterized by aggressive anti-Westernism and in the meantime, they do 
not reveal any specific vision of good or positive policy goals (ibidem). Likewise, Taylor 
underlines that “Russian conservatism is more properly seen as just anti-liberalism” (2015). 
Thus, discourses about Russia’s civilizational identity and conservative values have just 
instrumental significance and it will be hard for Russia to convince other countries to 
support in its social creativity strategy. 
Secondly, government’s conservative agenda does not seem to have a sufficient 
domestic support as well. In 2014, Russian respondents were asked to answer the following 
question: “in what kind of country you prefer to live: in a country, which (1) provides its 
people with material needs at the first rank, or (2) spiritual and cultural needs?”. As a 
result, 19 percent of them replied that they would choose “definitely first option”, whereas 
39 percent would “mostly prefer” the first variant. By contrast, only 6% would choose 
“definitely second option” and only 24% would “mostly prefer” it (Levada 2014). 
However, in 2014, 77 percent of Russian people believed that Russia can become 
prosperous only by its own identity, by moving on his special path, different from the West 
(ibidem). Thus, although Russia’s conservative agenda does not have an extensive support 
from Russian people, they still believe that this country should follow its own unique path.  
 
CONCLUSION   
Russia’s ruling elite strongly believes that after the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
Western powers have been deliberately downgrading Russia’s role in global affairs, 
therefore this ountry is not accepted as an equal player in international politics. As SIT 
suggests, states have a psychological need for national self-esteem and positive social 
identity and they engage in self-evaluation through social comparison with the significant 
‘Other’. Russia’s perceived unfair treatment from the West turned into an unfavorable 
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social comparison with Western powers and it is conceived by its leadership as a 
humiliating experience. Therefore, Russia had to adopt the different identity management 
strategies, thereby it seeks to achieve a positive social comparison and social identity by 
dint of attaining the higher international status. 
This study has shown that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria bear 
palpable hallmarks of social competition strategy that served to the purpose of defending 
Russia’s great power status and interests through assertive gestures. With its annexation of 
Crimea, Moscow sought to tighten its positions in the post-Soviet space that directly 
underpins its great power status. Moscow also demonstrated its ability to wage a new 
generation of warfare and once again deprived the right to the Western great powers to 
unilaterally interpret the international law. Second, Russia’s military campaign in Syria can 
be understood as an attempt to obstruct the West’s endeavor to topple down Assad’s 
regime that would run against Moscow’s interests. The latter showed to Washington that 
without considering Russia’s interests and role, solution of this international crisis can 
become a painstaking task for the United States. Syrian campaign was also particularly 
significant in a sense that after the collapse of USSR, Russia first time projected its hard 
power outside the post-Soviet space and it can undeniably be perceived as a status 
signaling behavior. As this thesis also has demonstrated, these military campaigns were 
driven by status-seeking rather than seeking security or material gains. Significantly, 
Russia’s assertive reaction to the perceived status humiliation was instigated by certain 
emotional factors, such as ressentiment and desire for retaliation. More specifically, 
Yanukovich’s overthrow and an attempt to topple down Assad’s regime in Syria were seen 
in Moscow as the severe forms of disrespect to Russia’s great power interests and these 
campaigns were responses to the perceived disrespect from the Western powers. 
Secondly, Russia’s conduct of social creativity strategy entails the revival of discourse 
about its unique civilizational identity and adherence to conservative values and political 
elite seeks to enhance the normative components of country’s international status. These 
two discourses aim to emphasize the moral and civilization superiority and positive 
distinctiveness of Russia from the West. in the meantine, its civilizational uniqueness and 
value distinctiveness serve to the purpose of maintaining self-sufficiency and independence 
from the West. From political elite’s point of view, in a multipolar world, the key players 
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must have the explicit civilizational credentials and Russia’s unique civilizational identity 
and its particular features are used instrumentally to claim its civilizational superiority over 
the Western civilization. On the other hand, with its promotion of traditional values, Russia 
claims to be morally superior to the West and judging by Lavrov’s comments, traditional, 
ethical values should substitute liberal values as a basis of interstate relations. This 
suggestion also implies that traditional values should substitute liberal values as the main 
criterion of status allocation, as the West maintains it. Consistent with social creativity 
strategy, Russia’s emphasize on civilizational and moral superiority indicates that this 
country acknowledges its inferiority to the West on the traditional status components 
(economy, demography, technological advancement etc) and brings into play the new 
normative criteria to assert its status and advantage. As Russian commentators argued, the 
unique civilizational identity and value distinctiveness are supposed to reinforce Russia 
independent stance as a sovereign pole in a multipolar world. However, due to the poorly 
instrumental nature of these discourses, it seems hard for Russia to attain this goal and 
maintain independence from the West. 
Finally, we should summarize all above-discussed points and clarify, what are the real 
status markers for Russia from the perspective of its ruling elite. Recognition of its great 
power status and centrality in the international system entails a number of provision, status 
markers. To start with, the West must acknowledge Russia’s special role in the post-Soviet 
space and limit the engagement of Western-dominated institutions in this region. Second, 
the Western powers should not disregard Russia’s role and an equal footing in the 
international decision-making related to the key conflicts and crises in the world, because 
as a major power, Russia has right to enjoy this privilege. Thirdly, the Western powers 
must ensure that Russia will get an opportunity to have its say over security in Europe and 
it entails reducing the centrality of NATO and the EU in European affairs. Fourth, the West 
should not depict liberal values as universal and it should stop the democracy promotion. 
Liberal normative standards should not be seen by the West as the essential criterion for 
granting the higher status to the states. Thus, social recognition of Russia’s status would be 
a confirmation of its international standing and it is necessary for the positive self-
evaluation, while denial of recognition is conceived a frustrating and humiliating 
experience for Russia.  
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